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THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CENSUS
CLAUSE: STATISTICAL ESTIMATES AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF AN "ACTUAL
ENUMERATION"
Thomas R. Lee*
This Article addresses the question of whether statistical methods of estimating the
population for purposes of congressional apportionment are consistent with the constitutional
requirement of an "actual enumeration." Although the existing literature generally asserts that
history provides no meaningful guidance on this question, this Article uncovers an extensive
historical record--of both British and American origin-that supports the conclusion that the
generation of the Framers understood that an "actual enumeration" would consist of an actual
count and would not be based on statistical estimation. Specifically, the Article shows that
assessments of population on both sides of the Atlantic routinely contrasted methods of
drawing "conjectural estimates" with the more costly approach of conducting an "actual
enumeration." Moreover, the Article identifies historical evidence that the Framers'
generation was well aware of the principal "modem" objection to enumeration-that the
inherent limitations of such an approach predictably lead to an undercount. Thus, the Article
concludes that the Framers prescribed a census by "actual enumeration" not out of navet6 or
unfamiliarity with methods of estimation, but to minimize the risk of political manipulation in
what they knew would always be a politically charged decision-the apportionment of seats
in the U.S. House of Representatives.
In 1997, the United States Census Bureau released a written report to
Congress outlining its proposal to use statistical sampling to supplement
the apportionment count in the 2000 census.' Two separate legal
challenges followed, one filed by various counties and States and the
other by the United States House of Representatives.2 Both suits alleged
that the Bureau's plan was unlawful under the Census Act and the
Census Clause of the United States Constitution.3
*Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, and lead counsel to
the State of Utah in Utah v. Evans. Thanks to John Fee, Jay Jorgensen, Michael Lee, Caleb Nelson,
James Rasband, Michelle Reed, Gene Schaerr, Hannah Smith, Adrian Vermeule, Lara Wolfson, and
John Yoo for their comments on earlier drafts, and to Steve Averett, Jaysen Oldroyd, and John
Valentine for their helpful research assistance.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE PLAN FOR
CENsuS 2000 (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter CENSUs 2000 REPORT].
2. See Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Va. 1998) (striking down the proposed method
of sampling as unlawful under the Census Act in suit brought by four counties and individuals from
thirteen different states); U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d
76 (D.D.C. 1998), aff'd, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (reaching the same result).
3. See Glavin, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543,545; House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court struck down the Bureau's sampling
proposal on statutory grounds.4 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
held that "there is only one plausible reading of [the Census Act]: It
prohibits the use of sampling in calculating the population for purposes
of apportionment."5 In so doing, the Court stopped short of deciding the
constitutional question of whether the Census Clause's requirement of an
"actual enumeration"6 forecloses the use of statistical methods.
That issue was taken up briefly in Justice Scalia's concurrence and in
Justice Stevens' dissent. Justice Scalia argued in support of the
majority's statutory interpretation based on the principle of
"constitutional doubt"-that "the statutory intent to permit use of
sampling for apportionment purposes is at least not clear," and that it is
"unquestionably doubtful whether the constitutional requirement of an
'actual Enumeration' . . . is satisfied by statistical sampling."'7 Justice
Scalia's view of the Constitution stemmed primarily from his
understanding of the text. He noted that "[d]ictionaries roughly
contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution" defined
"enumerate" as "to count"--"singly," "separately, .... number by
number," or "distinctly."8 Because the notion of such counting is
4. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 340 (1999). Because
the two cases were heard by a special three-judge court prescribed by statute, see Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub.
L No. 105-119, § 209(e)(I), III Stat. 2440, 2482 (codified in a note following 13 U.S.C. § 141
(Supp. 2000)), the cases were heard on direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court consolidated
both cases for oral argument and then affirmed the Glavin court's rulings on justiciability and on the
legality of the sampling proposal under the Census Act and dismissed the appeal in House of
Representatives for failing to present any additional substantial federal question. House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. at 328, 330, 344.
5. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 340. The operative provision of the Act is section 195,
which provides that "[e]xcept for the determination of population for purposes of apportionment of
Representatives in Congress among the several States, the Secretary shall, if he considers it feasible,
authorize the use of the statistical method known as 'sampling' in carrying out the provisions of this
title." 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1994). Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court acknowledged that this
provision's "except/shall" structure reasonably could be read on its face "as either permissive or
prohibitive with regard to the use of sampling" for apportionment. House of Representatives, 525
U.S. at 339. She concluded, however, that any ambiguity was clarified by the history of the Act.
Because "federal statutes have prohibited the use of statistical sampling where apportionment is
concerned" for over 200 years, Justice O'Connor concluded that Congress did not intend to overturn
this approach in section 195. Id. at 339-40.
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
7. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 346 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 346-47 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828); SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 658 (4th ed. 1773); THOMAS
SHERIDAN, COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)). For a contrary
Vol. 77:1, 2002
The History of "Actual Enumeration"
"incompatible... with gross statistical estimates," Scalia concluded that
"a strong case can be made that an apportionment census conducted with
the use of 'sampling techniques' is not the 'actual Enumeration' that the
Constitution requires." 9
Scalia also alluded briefly to historical practice. He noted that "tt]here
were difficult-to-reach inhabitants in the early 1800's, just as there are
today," and surmised that "it must have been known that various
methods of estimating unreachable people would be more accurate than
assuming that all unreachable people did not exist."' ° But because "such
methods of estimation have not been used for over two centuries,"
Justice Scalia asserted that "the early Congresses" must have "thought
that estimations were not permissible."'1
Justice Stevens also touched briefly on the constitutional question in
his dissent. Under the view outlined by Justice Stevens, "[t]he paramount
constitutional principle codified in th[e] [Census] Clause was the rule of
periodic reapportionment by means of a decennial census."' 2 Because
"[t]he July 1787 debate over future reapportionment of seats in the
House of Representatives did not include any dispute about proposed
methods of determining the population," Stevens opined that the addition
of the words "actual Enumeration" was merely a "stylistic change" that
"did not limit Congress' authority to determine the 'Manner' of
conducting the census."13
In this Article, I pick up where the Justices' opinions in House of
Representatives left off-discussing extensive historical detail relevant
to the questions raised by Justices Scalia and Stevens but not presented to
the Court in that case. In so doing, I disagree strongly with existing
scholarship that concludes-without the benefit of most of the material
discussed herein-that "the Founding Fathers have precious little
textual analysis, see Recent Cases, United States House of Representatives v. United States
Department of Commerce, 112 I-ARV. L. REV. 566, 569-70 (1998) (arguing that a 1981 edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary-which defines "actual" as "existing in fact" or in
"reality," and "enumeration" as "counting" or "listing"-suggests that the Census Clause "places a
valued premium on accuracy," and concluding that "the enumeration that least achieves this
goal ... is the most constitutionally suspect").
9. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 349.
10. Id. at 347-48. Here, Scalia referred to "Thomas Jefferson's 1782 estimate of the population of
Virginia" as an example of such a method. Id. This and many other methods of estimation known to
the generation of the Framers are discussed in Section II infra.
11. Id. at 348.
12. Id. at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Id.
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guidance to offer" on the meaning of the Actual Enumeration Clause. 4
In my view, the relevant historical record leaves little or no doubt that the
Framers understood that an "actual enumeration" would consist of an
actual count and would not be based on statistical estimation.
This conclusion is of more than academic interest. An informed,
original understanding of the constitutional requirement of an "actual
enumeration" will help to determine the census methodologies available
to Congress and to the Census Bureau in the future."i Even more
immediately, an original understanding of the Census Clause is relevant
to the apportionment of seats in the House in the 2000 census. Despite
the House of Representatives decision, the Census Bureau used a
statistical estimation method called "hot-deck imputation" in the 2000
census apportionment count,'6 and the use of that method shifted a seat in
the House from Utah to North Carolina. Utah has challenged that method
on both constitutional and statutory grounds, 7 and the Supreme Court
has scheduled oral argument in the case for March 27, 2002.8
In Section I, I offer some context for the dispute by reviewing the
history of the methods employed in the decennial census of the United
States, from the first census of 1790 to the most recent census in 2000.
After describing the methods of statistical estimation recently proposed
and employed by the Census Bureau, I identify the contours of the
14. See The First American Census in Methodological Perspective, THE WILSON QUARTERLY 141
(Winter 1999). For further discussion of the existing scholarship in this area, see Section I.C, infra.
15. See Recent Cases, supra note 8, at 568 (criticizing the three-judge court in the House of
Representatives case for failing "to consider serious constitutional issues," on the ground that this
failure "left the court's interpretation incomplete, and undermined its persuasiveness").
16. See RICHARD A. GRIFFIN: DSSD CENSUS 2000 PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS
MEMORANDUM SERIES #B-17, at 14 (Feb. 28, 2001); UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU: DSSD
CENSUS 2000 PROCEDURE AND OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM SERIES #Q-34, CENSUS 2000
SPECIFICATIONS FOR IMPUTING HOUSING UNIT STATUS AND POPULATION COUNTS, at 1-15 (Sep. 26,
2000) (explaining the hot-deck imputation procedure); Consolidated Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at IMJ 20, 47, Utah v. Evans, Civ.
No. 2:01-CV-000292G (D. Utah Nov. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Consolidated Memorandum] (conceding
that, absent the use of imputation in the 2000 census, one congressional seat allocated to North
Carolina would have been allocated to Utah).
17. In Utah v. Evans, No. 2:01-CV-000292G (D. Utah Nov. 1, 2001) (unpublished) (Murphy &
Kimball, JJ., with Greene, J., dissenting), a divided three-judge court for the United States District
Court for the District of Utah rejected Utah's claims on both grounds.
18. The Supreme Court granted review of this case in an order entered on January 22, 2002, No.
01-714, 534 U.S. _ (U.S., Order Granting Review, Jan. 22, 2002), and ordered expedited briefing
and scheduled oral argument in an order entered on January 24, 2002, No. 01-714, 534 U.S. __
(U.S., Order Scheduling Oral Argument, Jan. 24,2002).
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historical inquiry by reciting the originalist arguments put forward in the
House of Representatives and Utah litigation and by recounting the
limited scholarly work on this issue that has been published to date.
The balance of the Article is devoted to uncovering and interpreting
the relevant history, with particular focus on eighteenth-century usage of
the phrase "actual enumeration" in the course of contemporaneous
discussion of the "various methods of estimating unreachable people"
hypothesized by Justice Scalia to "have been known" to the founding
generation. 9 I begin in Part A of Section II by identifying an extensive
debate in eighteenth-century Britain concerning the state and direction of
that country's population. This discussion reveals that in the decades
leading up to the Constitution, the Framers' contemporaries in Britain
not only had implemented various methods of estimating the population
(including the equivalent of representative sampling by partial
enumeration), but had expressly acknowledged the difference between
such estimates and a full "actual enumeration."
Part B of Section II turns to the eighteenth-century American usage of
the constitutional language. Based on population assessments from the
pre-constitutional era, on the records of the Constitutional debate, and on
the history of the first census, I conclude that the Framers shared their
British contemporaries' understanding of an "actual enumeration."
Specifically, they understood the difference between an enumeration and
a mere estimate, and expressly acknowledged that an enumeration would
not yield a perfectly complete account of population; yet they accepted
an enumeration as the constitutionally prescribed "method" of
determining the population for purposes of apportionment. Accordingly,
in light of the extensive history uncovered and addressed here, I conclude
that the Framers' prescription for an "actual enumeration" can only be
understood to call for an actual, individualized count and to eschew
statistical adjustments to that count.
I. CENSUS-TAKING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The decennial census is conducted pursuant to the constitutional
requirement of an "actual Enumeration" of "the whole number of persons
in each [s]tate" as the basis for apportionment of seats in the U.S. House
of Representatives. 0 In the Census Act,2  Congress delegated
19. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
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responsibility for conducting the census to the Secretary of Commerce.22
The Secretary has the responsibility to conduct "a decennial census" of
the "population" of each of the United States.' The Secretary, in turn, is
authorized to delegate the performance of his functions and duties to
officers and employees of the Department of Commerce, such as the
Director of the Census Bureau. 4
"From the very first census, the census of 1790," Congress required
enumerators to "swear an oath to make 'a just and perfect enumeration'
of every person within the division to which they were assigned."' In
1810, Congress clarified that "'the said enumeration shall be made by an
actual inquiry at every dwelling-house, or of the head of every family
within each district, and not otherwise."' 26 This requirement-that
enumerators visit each home in person---"appeared in statutes governing
the next 14 censuses." 27
The current Census Act, enacted in 1954, initially contained
substantially similar language requiring enumerators to "'visit personally
each dwelling house in his subdivision' in order to obtain 'every item of
information and all particulars required for any census or survey'
conducted in connection with the census."' 8 In 1964, however, Congress
repealed the requirement that enumerators personally visit each housing
unit.' Thus, in the most recent four censuses, the Census Bureau has
relied initially on forms to be delivered and returned by mail, and has
used personal visits only as a "followup" procedure where the forms
were not returned by mail.3"
21. 13 U.S.C. §§ 1-401 (1994).
22. Id. § 4.
23. Id. § 141(a).
24. Id. § 4 (providing that the Secretary may delegate "the performance of such functions and
duties and the authority to issue such rules and regulations" delegated to the Secretary "to such
officers and employees of the Department of Commerce as he may designate"); id. § 21 (stating that
the Director of the Census is to be "appointed by the President" and "shall perform such duties as
may be imposed upon him by law, regulations, or orders of the Secretary").
25. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 335 (1999) (quoting
Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 101). The first census is discussed in greater detail infra notes 287-
320 and accompanying text.
26. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 335 (quoting Act of Mar. 26, 1810, § 1, 2 Stat. 565-
66).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 336 (quoting Act of Aug. 31, 1954, § 25(c), 68 Stat. 1012, 1015).
29. See id. at 337 (citing Act of Aug. 31, 1964, 78 Stat. 737).
30. See id.
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Despite its extensive "effort to reach every household" either by mail
or in person, "the Bureau has always failed to reach-and has thus failed
to count-a portion of the population."3 This "undercount" problem
gives rise to the constitutional question addressed herein: whether the
constitutional prescription for an "actual enumeration" should be read to
prohibit statistical methods of estimating persons not actually counted by
the methods set forth above. As explained below, the Bureau has
implemented one such statistical method and has proposed another. The
litigation spawned by these methods sets the stage for the historical
inquiry that is the focus of this Article.
A. Proposed and Actual Estimation in the 2000 Census
1. The Census Bureau's Method ofActual Enumeration
In executing the apportionment count in the 2000 census, the Census
Bureau began by compiling a "Master Address File"--i.e., a
comprehensive list of dwelling places within the United States-with the
assistance of the United States Postal Service, tribal, state, and local
governments, and canvasses of selected areas where other sources were
deemed unlikely to yield highly accurate address lists.3" After this
comprehensive file was in place, the Census Bureau employed a number
of different procedures in attempting to contact every housing unit on the
file.3
Three primary methods of enumeration were utilized in attempting to
contact every household on the Master Address File. First, the majority
of households (more than 80%) have city-style addresses (i.e., addresses
that contain a house number and a street name) and were contacted
through forms mailed to them through the United States Postal Service,
which they were to fill out and mail back to the Census Bureau.34 This is
known as the "mailout/mailback" procedure.
31. Id. at322.
32. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, THE CENSUS BUREAU'S MASTER ADDRESS FILE
(MAF): CENSUS 2000 ADDRESS LIST BASICS (Mar. 1999); UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, DSSD
CENSUS 2000 PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM #D6, SPECIFICATION FOR UPDATING
THE DECENNIAL MASTER ADDRESS FILE IN APRIL, 2000 (Mar. 27,2000).
33. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 OPERATIONAL PLAN § IX (Dec. 2000).
34. Id. § IX-1.
35. Id. §§ 11-2 to 1-4, IX-1.
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Second, for areas where addresses used for mail delivery are
predominantly non-city-style (i.e., rural postal route addresses or other
addresses that do not contain a house number and street name),
enumerators used a counting mechanism known as the "update/leave"
procedure.36 In performing that procedure, an enumerator would leave a
census form at a housing unit for a member of the household to complete
and mail back, and would update the entry for that housing unit in the
Master Address File.37
Finally, for housing units in remote and sparsely populated areas, the
Census Bureau employed the "list/enumerate" procedure. Under this
procedure, enumerators contacted the housing units in person, completed
census questionnaires following interviews with one or more occupants
of each unit, and recorded the addresses on the Master Address File.38
For all housing units listed on the Master Address File that were not
enumerated through these procedures, the Census Bureau conducted a
"Non-Response Follow-Up" (NRFU), in which enumerators attempted to
contact persons living in those housing units (either by telephone or
through a personal visit) and complete missing census questionnaires
following an interview with a member of the household.39 During NRFU,
several attempts were made to contact any housing units for which a
completed census response had not been obtained, or for households that
had been identified as vacant or non-existent." If an enumerator was
unable to contact any of the occupants of a particular housing unit after
multiple visits or telephone calls, he or she would attempt to complete
the census questionnaire for that housing unit using information obtained
36. Id.
37. Id. § IX-I.
38. Id. Some individuals not enumerated through one of the procedures described above were able
to obtain census forms from the local post office or by contacting a hotline through the "Be
Counted" program. Id. §§ IX-2 to IX-9. Targeted efforts to improve coverage were implemented in
difficult-to-enumerate areas. Id. Separate procedures were used by the Census Bureau to enumerate
"special populations," such as military bases, group living situations, persons without a usual
residence, etc. Id.
39. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2000: FINAL ATTEMPT
PROCEDURES FOR FOSS (NONRESPONSE FOLLOWUP), at 1-2, 4-7 (Apr. 2000); KENNETH PREWITT,
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ACCURACY AND COVERAGE EVALUATION:
STATEMENT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF USING STATISTICAL METHODS TO IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF
CENSUS 2000 8 (June 2000).
40. See PREWTT, supra note 39, at 8.
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from a "proxy" or from some other "last resort" method (e.g.,
conversations with neighbors, personal observations, etc.).41
As noted above, no matter how comprehensive the Bureau's efforts to
reach every household by these methods, some households inevitably go
uncounted. This "undercount" stems from a variety of sources: from
individual reluctance to respond to Census Bureau inquiries,42 to errors in
the Master Address File, 3 and many other reasons."
2. The Census Bureau's Methods of Estimation
The Census Bureau's 1997 Report to Congress contained one
proposed response to this undercount-the response that gave rise to the
litigation in the House of Representatives case. The Bureau's proposal
included three steps. First, the Bureau proposed to "send census forms to
all households, as well as make forms available in post offices and in
other public places."'4 The Bureau anticipated "that 67 percent of
households [would] return the forms. 46 Second, the Bureau planned "to
divide the population into census tracts of approximately 4,000 people
41. See id. During a second follow-up procedure known as "Coverage Improvement Follow-Up"
(CIFU), the Bureau made further attempts to verify information for housing units that were
identified as "vacant" or "delete" (i.e., of uncertain existence) during Non-Response Follow-Up, or
to obtain population data for housing units still lacking population counts. CENSUS 2000
OPERATIONAL PLAN, supra note 33, at §§ IX-13 to IX-14. in addition, housing units that were added
to the Master Address File during census operations, but which were not followed up on during
NRFU, were also contacted through CIFU. Id.
42. See, e g., CENSUS 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6.
43. See, ag., Affidavit of Peter A. Bounpan, Assistant Director for Demographic Censuses at the
Unites States Bureau of the Census, at 17, 34, Orr v. Baldridge, No. IP-81-604-C (S.D. Ind. July
1, 1985).
44. See, eg., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Census and Population of the Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 102nd Cong. 98-101 (Feb. 21. 1991) (statement of Stephen E. Fienberg)
(listing a number of sources of census error); Affidavit of Barbara A. Bailar, Associate Director for
Statistical Standards and Methodology at the United States Bureau of the Census, at 2 5, Orr v.
Baldridge, No. IP-81-604C (S.D. Ind. July 1, 1985); Memorandum from Deborah A. Hamer and
Kathryn F. Thomas, to Charles D. Jones, Chief of the Statistical Methods Division of the United
States Bureau of the Census 1 (Nov. 4, 1982) (noting that clerical error produces incomplete data);
PETER BOUNPANE AND CLIFTON JORDAN, PLANS FOR COVERAGE IMPROVEMENT IN THE 1980
CENSUS, at 2, 5 (noting that undercounts are exacerbated by the difficulty of enumerating transient
populations and by misunderstandings about who should be enumerated).
45. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 324 (1999) (citing
CENSUS 2000 REPORT, supra note 1).
46. Id.
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that [would] have 'homogeneous population characteristics, economic
status, and living conditions':
The Bureau would then visit a randomly selected sample of
nonresponding housing units, which would be "statistically
representative of all housing units in [a] nonresponding tract." The
rate of nonresponse follow-up in a tract would vary with the mail
response rate to ensure that the Bureau obtain[ed] census data from
at least 90 percent of the housing units in each census tract. For
instance, if a census tract had 1,000 housing units and 800 units
responded by mail, the Bureau would survey 100 out of the 200
nonresponding units to obtain information about 90 percent of the
housing units. However, if only 400 of the 1,000 housing units
responded by mail, the Bureau would visit 500 of the 600
nonresponding units to achieve the same result.47
Third, "[t]he information gathered from the nonresponding housing
units surveyed by the Bureau would then be used to estimate the size and
characteristics of the nonresponding housing units that the Bureau did
not visit." 8 "Thus, continuing with the first example, the Bureau would
use information about the 100 nonresponding units it visits to estimate
the characteristics of the remaining 100 nonresponding units on which
the Bureau has no information. ' 49
The Supreme Court struck down this procedure in House of
Representatives on statutory grounds. Specifically, the Court held that
the Bureau's proposed methodology was unlawful under section 195 of
the Census Act,5" which provides that "[e]xcept for the determination of
population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress
among the several States, the Secretary shall, if he considers it feasible,
authorize the use of the statistical method known as 'sampling' in
carrying out the provisions of this title."5' Although the Court
acknowledged that this provision's "except-shall" structure reasonably
could be read on its face "as either permissive or prohibitive with regard
to the use of sampling for apportionment," it held that any ambiguity was
47. Id.
48. Id. at 324-25.
49. Id. at 325.
50. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 317.
51. 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1994).
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clarified by the history of the Act. 2 Because "federal statutes have
prohibited the use of statistical sampling where apportionment is
concerned" for over 200 years, the Court held that Congress did not
intend to overturn this approach in section 195.
53
Despite this holding, the Census Bureau did not eliminate statistical
estimation methods from the 2000 apportionment count entirely. 4
Rather, the Bureau employed a procedure known as "hot-deck
imputation" to estimate the size of households not counted by the
mailout-mailback and follow-up methods described above.'5 Under the
hot-deck method, a housing unit not enumerated by such methods is
estimated to have the same number of occupants as the geographically
closest unit within the same census tract that was enumerated.56 This
estimate is derived from the Bureau's adoption of the "statistical
52. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 339.
53. Id. at 339-40.
54. In addition to implementing the "hot-deck imputation" method discussed below, the Bureau
also continued to use statistical sampling techniques designed for purposes other than congressional
apportionment, such as redistricting and congressional funding. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
UPDATED SUMMARY: CENSUS 2000 OPERATIONAL PLAN 1 (1999). Under these procedures, a post-
enumeration survey entitled the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation ("ACE") surveyed a sample of
some 300,000 housing units in an attempt to derive a more accurate picture of the population. Id. On
March 6, 2001, the Bush Administration announced its decision not to implement the results of the
ACE survey even for redistricting and funding purposes. Decision of the Secretary of Commerce to
Release the Tabulations of Population Reported to States and Localities Pursuant to 13 U.S.C.
§ 141(c), 66 Fed. Reg. 14520 (Mar. 13, 2001).
55. See GRIFFIN, supra note 16; DSSD CENSUS 2000 PROCEDURE AND OPERATIONS
MEMORANDUM SERIES #Q-34, supra note 16, at 1-15. The 2000 census was not the first census in
which hot-deck imputation was used to estimate the size of unenumerated households. Hot-deck
imputation was first used to supplement the apportionment count in the 1960 census. See Declaration
of Howard Hogan, 16, State of Utah v. Evans, Civ. No. 2:01-CV-00292G (Nov. 1, 2001);
Consolidated Memorandum, supra note 16, at 15. A similar method was used in the 1940 and 1950
censuses to estimate characteristics of the population (such as age), and not to estimate the actual
population count for apportionment purposes. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. CENSUS 195-97
(Margo J. Anderson ed., 2000); ROBERT M. JENKINS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE 1940 CENSUS
OF HOUSING AND POPULATION 45-48, 68-73 (1985); CENSUS 2000 REPORT, supra note 1. The
impact and extent of imputation in previous censuses is not clearly indicated by existing Census
Bureau records. In 1980, the Bureau's use of imputation shifted one seat in the House of
Representatives from Indiana to Florida. Orr v. Baldridge, No. IP-81-604-C, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ind.
July 1, 1985). Other than 1980, however, the Census Bureau has taken the position that its records
do not establish whether imputation has had any other impact on apportionment except to shift a seat
from Utah to North Carolina in the 2000 census. See Consolidated Memorandum, supra note 16, at
20; Declaration of Howard Hogan 50 n.9, State of Utah v. Evans, Civ. No. 2:01-CV-000292G
(Nov. 1,2001).
56. See DSSD CENSUS 2000 PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM SERIES #Q-34, supra
note 16, at 1-15; Declaration of Howard Hogan 17, State of Utah v. Evans, Civ. No. 2:01-CV-
000292G (Nov. 1,2001).
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principle of 'homogeneity,' or the tendency of households within a small
geographic area to be similar in most characteristics.
' 7
Hot-deck imputation was used to estimate the occupancy of all
housing units that, at the conclusion of the follow-up procedures
described above, were assigned an "unknown" status. In other words,
imputation was employed where census enumerators were unable to
determine (1) whether such units actually existed, (2) whether they were
occupied or vacant, or (3) the number of persons residing therein. 8 Like
the methodology struck down on statutory grounds in House of
Representatives, then, hot-deck imputation was designed to estimate the
size of housing units for which there was no actual count.
The hot-deck method differed from the sampling method struck down
in House of Representatives in two principal respects. First, imputation
invoked statistical estimation on a smaller scale. The plan challenged in
House of Representatives would have authorized the Bureau to count
90% of the housing units in each census tract by traditional methods of
enumeration, and then use a statistical model to estimate the remaining
10%. 9 The statistical imputation methodology employed in the 2000
census, by comparison, was used to estimate a much smaller percentage
of the housing units that were not counted by traditional enumeration
methods. Only about 0.43% of the total apportionment count was
included as a result of statistical imputation; the vast majority of the
apportionment count was produced by data compiled by traditional
methods of enumeration. °
Second, hot-deck imputation employs a different sample-selection
mechanism than that struck down in House of Representatives. Hot-deck
imputation relies on data derived from a non-random, individual "donor"
household to estimate individual households that were not enumerated by
the mailout-mailback and follow-up procedures noted above. The
methodology at issue in House of Representatives, on the other hand,
would have estimated the size of such unenumerated households by use
of "a randomly selected sample of nonresponding housing units, which
57. CENSUS 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
58. DSSD CENSUS 2000 PROCEDURE AND OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM SERIES #Q-34, supra note
16, at 2; UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, DRAFT, CENSUS 2000 IMPUTATION OF HOUSING UNIT
STATUS AND HOUSEHOLD POPULATION-RESULTS 1-2 (Jan. 3, 2001).
59. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,324 (1999).
60. See DSSD CENsUs 2000 PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM SERIES #B-17, supra
note 16, at 14.
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would be 'statistically representative of all housing units in [a]
nonresponding tract."''6'
B. The Ensuing Litigation and the Contours of the Historical Inquiry
The lawsuits filed in the wake of these methods of estimation have
sparked some interest in the original understanding of the Census Clause,
but have shed precious little light on the matter. The principal focus of
the briefs in the House of Representatives case was on the statutory
question that was ultimately decided by the Court-whether section 195
of the Census Act should be construed as "permissive or prohibitive with
regard to the use of sampling for apportionment purposes." 2 The
constitutional question was certainly raised by the parties and by their
amici, but the briefs failed to provide the Court with any comprehensive
history of the Founding generation's understanding of the notion of an
"actual enumeration" and its reconcilability with methods of statistical
estimation. Thus, Justice Scalia hypothesized in his concurrence that
"various methods of estimating unreachable people" likely "must have
been known" to the Framers,63 but the briefs of appellees and their amici
had identified only scant support for that proposition-such as "Thomas
Jefferson's 1782 estimate of the population of Virginia based upon
limited data and specific demographic assumptions," cited in Scalia's
concurrence.64
For their part, the briefs of appellants and their amici cited the
apparent dearth of historical evidence of the original meaning of an
"actual enumeration" as support for their position that "the phrase 'actual
Enumeration' was not intended to constrain Congress's choice of an
appropriate methodology for determining the number of persons within
each of the States., 65 Thus, the Solicitor General argued that there was no
historical evidence to suggest "that the Framers were familiar with
'estimation techniques' and deliberately chose language that would
preclude the use of such mechanisms. '66 Although appellees had
61. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 324.
62. Id. at 339.
63. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Reply Brief for Appellants at 17, U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives,
525 U.S. 316 (1999) (No. 98-404).
66. Id. at 18.
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identified Jefferson's 1782 assessment of the Virginia population as an
example of an estimation technique, the Solicitor General asserted that
such a method "did not involve efforts to ascertain the population
through actual inquiry of the people," but only "involved attempts to
utilize pre-existing data from various sources that had initially been
compiled for other purposes. 67 Accordingly, the Solicitor General
concluded that "[s]tatistical sampling as a probability method did not
exist at the time the Constitution was drafted" and that "the Framers
therefore could not have rejected its use. 68
The Solicitor General also sought to challenge the logic of the
distinction between an "estimate" and an "enumeration." Because the
Census Bureau does not and cannot execute a perfect count of all persons
in each State, the Solicitor General asserted that the method of
"ascertaining the numbers of persons within each State who can be
specifically located and identified... will produce only an
approximation of the numbers of persons actually residing within the
States, not an exact count thereof., 69 In this sense, the Solicitor General
concluded that "[t]he question before the Court" was whether the
Constitution "requires the Bureau to employ that particular method of
approximating the actual population-not whether.., the Constitution
prohibits estimation as such. 70
Finally, the Solicitor General argued that any preference that the
Framers might have had for an actual "count" over a mere "estimate"
should simply be understood to elevate precision and accuracy over
guesswork.71 "In common usage," in other words, an instruction to
"count" and not to "estimate" the "number of persons or objects at a
particular location" would be understood only to "reflect a desire for a
precisely accurate number," and not to prescribe a particular method of
assessing that number.72 In the Solicitor General's view, however, "[t]hat
distinction loses its significance... in situations (like the decennial
census of population) where precise accuracy is unattainable.73 In those
situations, the Solicitor General argued that "population figures derived
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Id.
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through the use of sampling.., more accurately reflect the actual
populations of the States than... figures produced without sampling," so
that the combination of a partial enumeration with a partial estimate is
more faithful to any originalist preference for an actual "count."74
The briefing in Utah v. Evans7 has focused on -similar issues.
Although House of Representatives conclusively resolved the question
whether section 195 was prohibitive or permissive (holding that it was
the former), the Utah case still presents an important question of
statutory interpretation: whether hot-deck imputation can be
characterized as a "statistical method known as 'sampling."' 76 Utah has
argued that it is, noting that the Bureau itself characterized imputation as
sampling in an attempt to establish historical precedent for the sampling
struck down in House of Representatives, and resting on the Bureau's
own definition of "sampling" as the use of "information on a portion of a
population" to "infer information" about unobserved portions or on the
population as a whole.77 The Bureau has argued to the contrary,
suggesting that Congress intended to prohibit only the narrow category
of "random" sampling struck down in House of Representatives and not
the more limited procedure of hot-deck imputation employed in the past
few censuses.78
On the constitutional question, the Bureau has adopted arguments that
mirror those asserted by the Solicitor General in House of
Representatives. Thus, the Bureau argues that hot-deck imputation is
consistent with the constitutional requirement of an "actual enumeration"
because the Framers may have been familiar with methods of estimation
that amounted to conjecture and guesswork, but there is no historical
evidence that the Framers were familiar with estimation techniques as
74. Id.
75. No. 2:01-CV-000292G (D. Utah Nov. 1, 2001) (unpublished) (Murphy & Kimball, JJ., vth
Greene, J., dissenting).
76. 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1994).
77. See Brief of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Utah v. Evans, No. 2:0 1-
CV-000292G (2001) 24 (citing CENsus 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 23; Hearing Before the
House Subcommittee on the Census, Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 57 (June 22,
2000) (Testimony of Census Bureau Director Kenneth Prewitt) ("[I]n the apportionment number
there will be a certain number of Census records which are put there through an imputed process.
Those are not people with names. They are not people who filled out a form. They are people who
our statistical processes lead us to believe by putting that Census record in there we have given the
country a more accurate number.").
78. See Consolidated Memorandun, supra note 16, at 34-39.
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sophisticated as those now utilized by the Bureau.79 In addition, the
Bureau contends that any assessment of population is in some sense an
"estimate," so any supposed constitutional ban on estimation is
meaningless."0  Finally, the Bureau suggests that any supposed
constitutional distinction between an estimate and an actual count should
be seen as a preference for accuracy, not a prescription of methodology.8
C. Scholarly Writing on the Original Meaning of an Actual
Enumeration
Current scholarly literature offers a similarly skeptical view of
history's role in circumscribing the constitutionality of various methods
of census-taking. In a 1998 workshop on this issue, a number of scholars
concurred in the conclusion that "the Founding Fathers have precious
little guidance to offer" on the question whether statistical estimation is a
permissible method of taking an actual enumeration of population." But
despite their sweeping conclusions, participants in this workshop offered
little indication that they had engaged in any careful examination of the
relevant historical sources. Instead, their consensus view that "the phrase
'actual Enumeration"' does not "seem laden with any great
significance,"83 was based on the notion that the Framers "knew nothing
of sampling as such, and could not have rejected its use." 4 A 1981 Note
in the Harvard Law Review offered the same view: that "the Framers
could not have contemplated today's sophisticated methods of statistical
correction," and thus that "it would be foolish to read 'actual
enumeration' as requiring a headcount if more accurate results can be
achieved by using a headcount as modified by adjustment methods.""
79. Id. at 52 (stating that "the type of 'estimation' about which the Framers were concerned was
that based on conjecture, projections, political dealmaking or pure guesswork, not the limited use of
a procedure designed to deal with inevitable errors or missing data during a census that is attempting
to count every inhabitant").
80. Id. at 53 (arguing that a decision "[n]ot to impute a plausible value is to impute zero occupants
for [unenumerated] households, which is the equivalent of not counting the individuals in those
households").
81. Id. at 52-53.
82. The First American Census in Methodological Perspective, supra note 14.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Note, Demography and Distrust: Constitutional Issues of the Federal Census, 94 HARv. L.
REV. 841, 854 (1981). In my view, the question of original intent is unfairly loaded when it is
phrased in terms of whether the Framers envisioned a "headcount." From the very first census,
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Most of the other scholarly writing on this issue has reached similar
conclusions.86
Recent scholarship has also embraced the Solicitor General's attempt
to cast statistical estimation as logically inevitable and to characterize the
Census Clause as ultimately resting on a preference for accuracy over
conjecture. A recent Note in the Harvard Law Review on the House of
enumerators have been charged with acquiring data from members of households and others who
may have firsthand knowledge of the numbers relevant to the census. See text accompanying notes
287-95, infra. The same approach to an "actual enumeration" of population was followed in
eighteenth-century Britain. See text accompanying notes 158-69, infra. Thus, there is no historical
basis for the premise that an actual enumeration requires a "headcount" in the sense of including
only those persons who are visually verified and counted by the enumerator. Rather, the originalist
notion of enumeration that I envision and argue for here is one that requires an actual count by
means of data gathered for individual households from persons who have firsthand knowledge of the
number of persons living in such households. As explained in detail below, historically this would
have been understood as an "actual enumeration" despite the fact that many of those who were
enumerated were never visually counted by the enumerator.
86. See David B. Goldin, Numbers Wars: A Decade of Census Litigation, 32 U. TOL L REV. 1,
13 (2000) (arguing that the conclusion that "Congress prohibited the use of sampling in connection
wvith the census in 1790 is an anachronism, since the use of sampling had not yet been invented," and
asserting that the historical evidence could just as well be cited to support a ban on "the use of
telephones and the Interet as to prohibit sampling"); Jeffery S. Crampton, Comment, Lies, Damn
Lies and Statistics: Dispelling Some Myths Surrounding the United States Census, I DErRO1T C. L
REv. 71, 86 (1990) ("There is no way the founders could have known about the sophisticated
sampling techniques used today."); Stephanie M. Zlasney, Casenote, U.S. Dep't of Commerce v.
U.S. House of Representatives, Article I, Section 2, Clause 3-Census Clause-Proposal To Use
Statistical Sampling in the 2000 Census in Conjunction with Traditional Enumerated Method To
Calculate the Population for Purposes of Apportionment Violates the Census Act, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. LJ. 653, 690 (2000) (concluding that "the Framers could not have been aware of the rapid
growth and diverse nature of the United States in the future," and that they "were unaware of the
statistical methods that would later emerge to remedy what has become known as the undercount").
The lone holdouts that I have found in the academic literature are Jennifer M. Safavian, Down for
the Count: The Constitutional, Political and Policy Related Problems of Census Sampling, 8 GEO.
MASON L REv. 477 (2000), and Daniel Garth Hazard, Note, U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House
of Representatives-Constitutional Text: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, 32 U. TOL. L. REv. 89 (2000).
Safavian, a former Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director of the Subcommittee of the House of
Representatives that oversees the census, argues that "the use of sampling to determine the United
States' population is both politically questionable and constitutionally suspect," Safavian, supra, at
478, and in so doing summarily covers some of the material that I address herein, see id. at 507-13
(discussing the debate over the Census Clause). Safavian's inquiry thus intersects mine in this
minimal respect, but her focus is on policy, not on original intent Her examination of the history of
the Census Clause, in other words, is offered in support of her conclusion that "[a] direct headcount
would preclude the threat of political manipulation of the census-a factor critical to the Framers."
Id. at 513. She makes no attempt to examine the historical material relevant to the original
understanding of an "actual Enumeration." Id. (setting aside the question whether "the Framers
could... have imagined the country as it is today, or the advances in statistical methods"). Hazard's
student Note provides only a description of the Court's opinions in the case and of the arguments
raised in the parties' briefs.
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Representatives case concludes, for example, that "the traditional
headcount is itself no more than one category of statistical sample: one in
which those who are 'enumerated' are taken to represent the whole
number of persons, without any further statistical checks or controls."87
Another Note in the same journal argues that the Census Act "places a
valued premium on accuracy," and that "[a]lthough no enumeration will
count everyone, the enumeration that least achieves this goal-the
enumeration that unnecessarily invites inaccuracy-is the most
constitutionally suspect."'88
II. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF AN ACTUAL
ENUMERATION
Thus, prevailing wisdom rejects the role of history in circumscribing
the methods of census-taking that are available under the Census Clause.
As set forth in detail above, this view of the Census Clause hinges on
three principal points: (1) that the Framers did not understand the
sophisticated methods of statistical correction available today and thus
could not have intended to foreclose them; (2) that in the absence of any
such knowledge, the Framers must have intended only to prescribe a
principle of accuracy, and not any particular method of conducting the
census; and (3) that any assessment of population is necessarily a mere
estimate, so a supposed proscription of estimation is meaningless.
As an initial matter, the underlying premise of these assertions could
certainly be questioned. The deconstructionist argument that statistical
estimation is inevitable or that all counts are mere estimations depends
on a fundamental logical flaw: that the Constitution is equally offended
by the exclusion of those who cannot be enumerated as it is by the
87. Leading Cases, 113 HARv. L. REv. 349, 357 n.60 (1999); see also Goldin, supra note 86, at
15 n.127 (asserting that some form of statistical estimation is inevitable in that "the number of
people in the United States cannot be confirmed by immediate experience," but is "dependent on
complex scientific and management models and processes that are designed to ensure the taking of
an accurate census insofar as humanly possible").
88. Recent Cases, supra note 8, at 570; see also Crampton, supra note 86, at 86 (asserting that
"the intent of the framers was to gain an accurate count of the people for use in apportioning seats in
the House of Representatives," and thus that they must have intended to sanction "the best means
available for obtaining an accurate count"); Michael V. McKay, Note, Constitutional Implications of
a Population Undercount: Making Sense of the Census Clause, 69 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1446 (1981)
(arguing that the Census Clause "appears to mandate a complete count of the population," "is silent
about census methodology," and "does not bar the Bureau from obtaining a complete count by
means other than a physical headcount").
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inclusion of those same persons by methods of statistical estimation.
Such a construction of the Census Clause would nullify its plain
language; the Framers could not have intended simultaneously to forbid
the use of statistical estimates in the census while at the same time
requiring their use. Instead, the plain language prescribes an "actual
enumeration"-a census based on the numbers of persons that are
counted "singly," "separately, .... number by number," or "distinctly." 9
Thus, the Census Clause necessarily assumes that all persons who cannot
be enumerated will be excluded from the apportionment. Exclusion of
those persons accordingly does not imply that they are "estimated" out of
existence; it simply means that, for whatever reason, they could not be
"enumerated" and therefore included in the apportionment count.
Inclusion of those same persons, on the other hand, would run afoul of
the express constitutional command and cannot be deemed to be
equivalent."
The search for evidence of the Framers' contemplation of modem
statistical methods is equally flawed. The relevant question in the search
for original understanding is not whether the Framers of the Constitution
specifically "rejected" or even "contemplated today's sophisticated
methods of statistical correction."91 Instead, the question is simply
89. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 347 (1999) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828); SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 658 (4th ed. 1773); THOMAS
SHERIDAN, COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)).
90. Moreover, the argument that estimation is inevitable applies with equal force to the "gross
statistical estimates" that were called into constitutional doubt in House of Representatives. The
Bureau proposed to conduct those estimates to correct for what it perceived as an inevitable
undercount of population in some areas and among some groups. See House of Representatives, 525
U.S. at 320.
91. Note, supra note 85, at 854; see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,
226 (1986) (holding that the so-called "Qualifications Clause" of Article I, § 2 applies to primary
elections notwithstanding the fact that the Framers did not "contemplate the effects of that provision
upon the modem system ofparty primaries"); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315-16 (1941):
[[In determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a new subject matter, it is of
little significance that it is one with which the framers were not familiar. For in setting up an
enduring framework of government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in
all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the
instrument itself discloses.
Even if this premise were accepted as the proper starting point, it would not sustain the Census
Bureau's current practice of hot-deck imputation. As discussed at notes 128-41, 211-52, infra, the
Framers certainly were familiar with methods of statistical estimation that were at least as
"sophisticated" as the current practice of assigning an unenumerated household the population count
of its nearest neighbor.
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whether the Framers would have understood the words "actual
enumeration" to foreclose estimation and to require an actual count.92 If
they did, the subsequent development of more sophisticated methods of
estimation might provide the impetus for a constitutional amendment, but
it does not provide a basis for the Court to rewrite the existing
constitutional language.93
My approach here, however, is not to quarrel with the premise of this
inquiry, but rather to refute its conclusions. In this Section, I offer a
detailed historical response to the prevailing skepticism toward history's
role in circumscribing the constitutionally permissible methods of
census-taking. In so doing, I demonstrate that during the crucial period of
the ratification of the Constitution, the words "actual enumeration" were
used on both sides of the Atlantic to describe an actual, individualized
count and to contrast such a count with a mere estimate. Various
methods of estimation were employed where enumerations were
impracticable or incomplete, and the distinction between the two
approaches was widely acknowledged. On one hand, both Americans
and Britons in the founding era understood that some broad estimates of
population would not be as reliable as an actual enumeration of the full
population, particularly where they were based on non-representative
data acquired by enumeration. On the other hand, they also
acknowledged that an actual enumeration itself was not perfect-that
some persons would be omitted from official enumeration returns as a
result of the negligence of the enumerators or the recalcitrance of those
being counted.
92. For a contrary view in the academic literature, see Recent Cases, supra note 8, at 571 (arguing
that "[t]imes change," and that "methods of traditional enumeration" must evolve in order to
"overcome the diminished capacity to produce an accurate enumeration"); id. at 571 n.52 (citing
Oliver Wendell Holmes' aphorism that "[ilt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV," and that "[ilt is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past").
93. Moreover, if the premise of the skeptical view were accepted, it would embroil the federal
courts in an endless series of subjective inquiries into which estimation procedures are of
comparable reliability to those of the Framers' day, and which methods are sufficiently accurate to
pass constitutional muster. It is difficult to imagine any workable standard for choosing between
competing experts as they argue about whether a particular method of estimation meets some
undefined minimum level of reliability. See House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("The prospect of this Court's reviewing estimation techniques in the future, to
determine which of them so obviously creates a distortion that it cannot be allowed, is not a happy
one."). This cannot be what the Framers of the Census Clause intended.
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With the backdrop of this history, there can be little doubt that the
Framers understood an "actual enumeration" to encompass an
individualized count and to eschew methods of estimation.- In light of
their clear understanding of the shortfalls of the practice of counting the
population by an enumeration, and of their conception of various
methods of estimating populations that could not be fully enumerated,
the Constitutional proscription of methods of estimation could hardly
have been more clearly stated than by the requirement of an "actual
enumeration."94
A. Enumerations and Estimates in Eighteenth-Century Britain
Throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century, an extensive,
widely published debate raged in England over whether the British
population had fallen since the Glorious Revolution of 1 688.9' Interest in
this issue was fueled primarily by concerns related to matters of defense.
It was generally acknowledged "that the strength of a state consists in the
number of [its] people,"96 and that population "gives force and strength
94. To be sure, the Census Clause goes on to vest in Congress the authority to effect the actual
enumeration "in such Manner as [it] shall by Law direct," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, but
Congress's discretion is limited by "the constitutional language." Wisconsin v. City of New York,
517 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1996). Thus, Congress's constitutional authority to direct the "manner" of the
taking of the census leaves it free to decide which enumerative methods it will embrace (such as
whether to send questionnaires by mail and whether and to what extent to require follov-up visits by
individual enumerators), but this language cannot be read to trump the requirement of an "actual
enumeration" and to permit a census by non-enumerative methods such as statistical estimation.
95. The most comprehensive modem treatment of the debate is D.V. GLASS, NUMBERING THE
PEOPLE: THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY POPULATION CONTROVERSY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CENSUS AND VITAL STATISTICS IN BRITAIN (1973). [hereinafter GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE].
Glass offers a useful summary of the various contributions to the debate, and-even more
significantly for my purposes here-also provides a separate reprint of many of the original source
materials evidencing the debate. See THE POPULATION CONTROVERSY (D.V. Glass ed., 1973)
[hereinafter GLASS, CONTROVERSY]; THE DEVELOPMENT OF POPULATION STATISTICS (D.V. Glass
ed., 1973). For other discussions of the eighteenth-century debate, see JAMES H. CASSEDY,
DEMOGRAPHY IN EARLY AMERICA: BEGINNINGS OF THE STATISTICAL MIND, 1600-1800 196-97
(1969); M.W. FLINN, BRITISH POPULATION GROWTH, 1700-1850 (1970); Edward C.K. Gonner, The
Population of England in the Eighteenth Century, J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 261 (Feb. 1913).
96. See Richard Price, Observations on the Expectations of Lives, the Increase of Mankind, the
Influence of Great Towns on Population, and Particularly the State of London, with Respect to
Healthfulness and Number of Inhabitants, 59 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
SOCIETY 89,118 (1769), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
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to repel the attacks of foreign enemies."97 In light of "new incumbrances
and difficulties" as well as a new "foreign war," the general sentiment
was that the question of the state and direction of Britain's population
was of utmost significance. 8
Those who concluded that the population was in decline called for the
"encouragement of population" as "one of the first objects of policy.799
On the other hand, those who painted a more optimistic picture saw it as
their duty to use their "utmost endeavours to stop the effects of [the]
misrepresentations" of their adversaries.'00 In the optimists' view, there
was "surely" no less opportune time to "depress the spirit of the nation"
than a time "when we are surrounded by numerous and powerful
enemies, through whom we must fight our way, or sink into the most
humiliating state of insignificancy, or perhaps contempt, amongst the
nations of Europe.''.
Despite the stridency of the rhetoric, neither side of the debate was
able to offer any concrete, verifiable support for its position.0 2 There
would be no census of the British population until 1801.103 In 1753,
Thomas Potter had introduced a bill in Parliament calling for the "Taking
and Registering an Annual Account of the Total Number of
People... from every Parish and Extraparochial Place in Great
Britain."' 4 But the bill provoked vocal, extensive opposition. Opponents
of Potter's bill offered arguments reminiscent of modem concerns with
census-taking. They complained, for example, that the requirement of
97. UNCERTAINTY OF THE PRESENT POPULATION OF THIS KINGDOM I (London 1781), reprinted
in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95; see also RICHARD PRICE, AN ESSAY ON THE POPULATION
OF ENGLAND, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT TIME 23 (London 1780), reprinted in GLASS,
CONTROVERSY, supra note 95 (expressing the concern that "it appears, that between the years 1761
and 1777 a destruction has taken place of at least 55,771 houses having less than 8 windows; which
is equal to the loss of above a quarter of a million of those inhabitants who furnish recruits for our
navy and army, and trading ships; and who, therefore, constitute the main strength of the kingdom").
98. PRICE, supra note 97, at 32.
99. Id. at 118.
100. WILLIAM WALES, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRESENT STATE OF POPULATION IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 2 (London 1781), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
101. 1d.
102. See GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 5 (asserting that "[t]he arguments put
forward on both sides were faulty and the evidence drawn upon was often unreliable"); id. at 12
(noting that "a lengthy debate on the absolute growth or decline of the population of England and
Wales could be maintained only because of the inadequacy of contemporary population statistics").
103. See infra notes 170-87 and accompanying text.
104. Geo. 3, ch. 357.d.10(40) (1753) (Eng.).
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"enter[ing] every house ... to demand an account of the number of
persons who reside in it"' 5 would require "infinite labour in some large
country parishes," as the officers charged with conducting the count
"must often call several times at a farm house, before they can find any
body at home to given them a proper answer."' 6 Potter's opponents also
complained that a census would result in both under- and over-counting,
as those who were traveling or who owned two different houses could be
"twice reckoned in the account, or entirely left out of it."' 7 In addition,
the bill's opponents noted the superstitious view held by many that an
enumeration might result in some sort of pestilence,' and argued that
proponents of the census had ulterior motives of establishing the basis
for "the imposition of new taxes,"'0 9 to the extent that the proposed
census was "totally subversive of the last remains of English liberty.""
In light of these objections, or perhaps in the absence of any equally
vocal or articulate supporter,"' the bill was allowed to lapse after a
second reading in the House of Lords."'
In the absence of eighteenth-century census data, both sides of the
debate simply drew their own inferences and offered competing
estimates based on the limited data that had been amassed. In so doing,
the participants in the debate shed significant light on the original
understanding of the Census Clause in two important respects. First,
participants in the debate indicated their awareness of various methods of
estimating populations-so much so that the debate is given credit for
"stimulat[ing] demographic inquiries and form[ing] the
background... of the development of regular censuses and civil vital
registration in the nineteenth century.""' 3 Second, and more importantly
for present purposes, the participants in the debate consistently used the
105. XIV HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, 1747-1753 1325 (1813).
106. Id. at 1334.
107. Id. at 1333.
108. Id. at 1330. Such superstitious concerns are undoubtedly traceable to the Old Testament
account of the plagues visited upon the ancient Israelites following King David's attempt to survey
his people. See 2 Samuel 24:1-25; 1 Chronicles 21:1-27.
109. XIV HANsARD'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 105, at 1323.
110. Id. at 1320.
111. See GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 18 (asserting that it was "unfortunate
that the Bill should have been introduced by Thomas Potter," who "behaved rather arrogantly in the
House").
112. XIV HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 105, at 1319,1365.
113. Id.
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term "enumeration" and the phrase "actual enumeration" to refer to an
actual count-and in express contrast with methods of estimation.
1. Eighteenth-Century Estimates of a Declining British Population
One of the early advocates of the view that Britain's population was
falling (or at least stagnant) was William Brakenridge." 4 In a series of
papers published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society,
Brakenridge argued first that the population of England and Wales was
increasing only slightly," 5 and later that it actually was declining." 6
Brakenridge estimated the population of England and Wales by first
calculating an "average" number of persons per household-based on
"an exact account of the numbers in each house in a certain parish in
London."".7 On the basis of this exact account, Brakenridge asserted that
the number of persons "exactly come to six in a house, empty and full
together, for there is seldom above one in twenty empty.""' Brakenridge
also attempted to explain-albeit without using such modem statistical
terminology-that his non-random sample was nevertheless
representative, "as in that parish [chosen for the actual count] the people
are in a middle condition" in the sense that they "are in a middle state
with regard to numbers, between the very great families and those in the
lowest rank."".9
Next, Brakenridge sought to apply this average of six per house to the
total number of houses in England and Wales. In order to assess the total
number of houses, Brakenridge "applied to one of the Public Offices"--
apparently the Window Tax Office-to acquire that office's
"account... of all the houses throughout England and Wales, in order
114. See GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 51 (summarizing Brakenridge's
estimates and contributions to the debate).
115. See William Brackenridge, A Letter to George Lewis Scot, Esq., F.R.S., Concerning the
Number of People in England, 49 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY I 268
(1755), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
116. See William Brakenridge, A Letter to George Lewis Scot, Esq., Concerning the Present
Increase of the People in Britain and Ireland, 49 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
SOCIETY II 877 (1756), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
117. See William Brakenridge, A Letter from the Reverend William Brakenridge, D.D. and F.R.S.
to George Lewis Scot, Esq., F.R.S., Concerning the Number of Inhabitants Within the London Bills
of Mortality, 48 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY II 796 (1755), reprinted in




The History of "Actual Enumeration"
for some Assessment upon them.'1 2° In 1710, the Window Tax Office
reported 729,048 houses in England and Wales. Before arriving at his
final estimate of the population in 1710, Brakenridge noted a concern
that "a number of Cottages were omitted" from the accounts taken by the
Window Tax Office, on the ground that that such cottages "might be
improper for that Assessment.'' With no explanation other than his
personal view that "the Surveyors, if they had any care of the Public
Revenue, would never omit above one in Five," Brakenridge proposed an
adjustment to the window tax returns "one-fourth part of that number
more," so that "those omitted will be about 182,262, and the whole
number of houses could not exceed 911,310."'" On this basis,
Brakenridge concluded that "if we allow six persons to a house at an
average, according to what has been mentioned, the number of persons
through England and Wales, before the year 1710, could not be above
5,467,860. ' 23
To gauge the change in the population over time, Brakenridge
subsequently used this same methodology using window tax returns for
1750.124 Brakenridge first noted that "from the survey lately made of the
window lights, after the year 1750, there are about 690,000 houses
charged to that Tax in England and Wales, besides cottages that pay
nothing."'" Although he conceded that "the number of cottages [was]
not accurately known," Brakenridge asserted that "from the accounts
given... they cannot amount to above 200,000. ' 121
Brakenridge argued in favor of this adjustment on the ground that it
was consistent with a "late survey" of Middlesex, London, Westminster,
and Southwark, which had shown a number of cottages and uninhabited
houses in "nearly the same proportion" as the adjustment he had used. 27
120. Brakenridge, supra note 115, at 270. The window tax was an assessment that "increased with
the increasing number of windows," but that exempted "houses with fewer than eight windows" as
well as "[w]indows in houses on farms under 200L a year." J.R. McCutLLocH, A TREATISE ON THE
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE OF TAXATION AND THE FUNDING SYSTEM 273 (D.P.
O'Brien ed., 1975). As noted infra notes 146, 162, and 166, these exemptions called into question
the reliability of window tax returns as a comprehensive record of the number of houses.
121. Brakenridge, supra note 115, at 270.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 271.
124. See Brakenridge, supra note 116, at 887.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. William Brakenridge, A Letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of Macclesfield, President
of the Royal Society, from the Rev. William Brakenridge, D.D. F.R.S. containing an Answer to the
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And again, Brakenridge sought to justify the representative nature of the
survey, arguing that in the surveyed area "the poor are as numerous as in
most places in the dngdom."'2 8 On this basis, Brakenridge concluded
that there were about 890,000 houses in England and Wales in 1750, and
thus estimated that the total population had decreased in the period since
1710 to about "5,340,000 people."'29
Brakenridge's approach was subsequently advanced by Richard Price,
the most "dominant figure" to advocate the view that the population was
in decline.'30 Price was "generally considered the most authoritative
writer of his time on life assurance and annuities,''. and he relied on this
expertise in formulating his initial estimates of the purportedly declining
population of London. In his first publication on this issue, a letter to
Benjamin Franklin in 1769, Price based his estimates of the population of
London on the '"able of Observations," which established "the number
that die annually at all ages, out of a given number alive at those ages,"
and on the "bills of mortality," which recorded annual births in a
particular locality.'32 According to Price, "the number of inhabitants in a
place" could be determined by multiplying "the expectation of an infant
just born" (provided by the Table of Observations) by the "number of
yearly births" (provided by the bills of mortality).' By this method,
Price concluded that the population of London had declined during the
period of 1737 to 1769-specifically, that "the number [of inhabitants]
then was 735,840, or 84,260 greater than the number at present.'
34
Price offered more extensive estimates in subsequent publications,
some of which were summarized in his Essay on the Present State of
Population in England and Wales. 3 There, Price concluded that from
1690 to 1777 the population of England and Wales had "decreased near a
Account of the Numbers and Increase of the People of England, by the Rev. Mr. Forster, 50
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY I 471 (1758), reprinted in GLASS,
CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
128. Id.
129. Brakenridge, supra note 116, at 887.
130. GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 53.
131. Id.; see also W. MORGAN, A REVIEW OF DR. PRICE'S WRITINGS ON THE FINANCES OF GREAT
BRITAIN 5 (1795).
132. Price, supra note 96, at 96-97.
133. Id. at 97.
134. Id. at 107.
135. PRICE,supra note 97.
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quarter" and was "short of five millions" in 1777.36 Price's estimate
followed Brakenridge's approach discussed above. First, he calculated an
"allowance"-based on "surveys" conducted in various towns and
parishes conducted during the 1750s and 1760s-of something less than
five persons per house. 137 Second, Price assessed the number of houses at
the relevant time periods based on the 1777 returns of the British
"window tax" and the 1690 returns of the "hearth tax."' 3' Because the
window tax returns showed the "number of houses in England and Wales
in 1777 to be 952,734,"'139 while the hearth tax returns indicated that
"[t]he number of houses in England and Wales was at the Revolution
1,319,215,' ' 4 Price concluded based on his "allowance" that "[our
people, therefore, since that aera, have decreased near a quarter.
' 14 1
2. The Critical Response: Alternative Estimates and the Contrast with
an "Actual Enumeration "
The estimates of a decline in the population put forward by
Brakenridge and Price elicited a series of critical responses.
Brakenridge's principal critic-Richard Forster-asserted that without
data as to the "actual number of people," Brakenridge's "reasoning" was
"not much better than groping in the dark.""14 Despite this skepticism for
Brakenridge's method of estimation, however, Forster himself proceeded
136. Id. at 14, 18.
137. Id. at 5-8.
138. Id. at 2-5. The window taxes, described at supra note 120, "were preceded by, and may
indeed be regarded as, a substitute for hearth-money, or the old duty on hearths or fireplaces."
MCCULLOCH, supra note 120, at 273. The hearth tax was "charged upon every hearth in all houses
paying to church and poor," and officers "engaged in its collection [were authorized] to enter houses
to ascertain the number of fire-places." Id. at 274. In light of the invasion of privacy occasioned by
this procedure, the hearth tax was abolished at the Glorious Revolution, and soon thereafter vWas
replaced by the window tax. Id. For further discussion of the hearth and vndow taxes, see F.M.
EDEN, AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 2025
(1800), and W.R. WARD, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE WINDOW AND ASSESSED TAXES 1696-1798,
in THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 522-42 (J.G Edwards & Richard Parcs eds., 1952).
139. PRICE, supra note 97, at 14.
140. Id. at 17-18.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Richard Forster, An Extract of the Register of the Parish of Great Shefford, near Lamborne,
in Berkshire, for Ten Years: with Observations on the Same: in a Letter to Tho. Birch, D.D. Secret.
R.S. from the Rev. Mr. Richard Forster, Rector of Great Shefford, 50 PHILOSOPHICAL
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY I 359 (1757), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra
note 95.
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to offer his own competing (and higher) estimate using the same general
methodology. First, Forster challenged Brakenridge's assessment of six
persons per house, insisting on this point that Brakenridge's numbers
were actually too high. Based on Forster's own survey of the parish of
Great Shefford, Forster asserted that Brakenridge's allotment of six
persons per house was "too big."'43 Forster's survey indicated an average
of "not quite 43/4 to a house," and he accordingly asserted that "5 to a
house. . . is as much as ought to be allowed."'"
Forster insisted, however, that Brakenridge's estimates nevertheless
were much "too small."' 45 He based this conclusion on his opinion that
Brakenridge had significantly underestimated the number of houses,
arguing "that more than two thirds of all the houses are downright
cottages," and thus would have been "excluded" from the window tax
returns. 46 Initially, Forster based his opinion as to the number of cottages
on his survey of the parish of Great Shefford.4 7 In subsequent writings,
however, Forster acknowledged the need to broaden his survey beyond a
single parish, and to draw a distinction between the "country" and the
"cities and flourishing towns.', 148 Forster recognized, in other words, that
both his and Brakenridge's estimates initially relied on "too few data,"
and he eventually argued in favor of his own view based on surveys of
"ten parishes, widely scattered through Southern England." '149 Ultimately,
Forster estimated that the total population of England and Wales in 1750
was approximately 7,509,608, a number that he claimed would be "found
nearer the truth, than anything hitherto advanced."' 50
Price's estimates also drew heavy fire. One early critic was Arthur






148. Richard Forster, A Letter to the Rev. Thomas Birch, D.D. Secr. R.S. Concerning the Number
of the People of England; by the Rev. Mr. Richard Forster, Rector of Great Shefford in Berkshire, 50
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY 1 457-59 (1757), reprinted in GLASS,
CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
149. GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 51 (citing Birch MSS 4440, No. 176
(Letter from Richard Forster dated Dec. 2, 1760)).
150. Forster, supra note 148, at 460.
151. ARTHUR YOUNG, REPLY TO DR. PRICE, TO THE PRINTER OF THE ST. JAMES CHRONICLE
(1772), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
Vol. 77:1, 2002
The History of "Actual Enumeration"
Reply complained that Price's "positive assertions ... on the number of
the people... are by no means attended with any but conjectural
proofs," and are "supported" only "by arguments; which, if you approve,
you may accept; and if not, reject."' 52 More specifically (and
significantly for present purposes), Young complained that Price's
assessment of "the number of houses" was "not from an actual
enumeration (for none was ever yet made) but calculated from the hearth
tax.'
53
William Eden expanded on this same objection. Eden "considered the
notion of any progressive decrease in the numbers of the people as a
phantom, which has in all ages haunted the joyless imaginations of some
speculative men, but which has not at present any solid existence."'"
And like Young, Eden couched his skepticism in terms that drew an
explicit contrast between Price's estimates and an "actual enumeration":
Enquiries then concerning the causes of population must not rashly
be admitted to prove any thing, farther than they are supported by
facts. We are not ... to infer a general depopulation from partial
instances. The most decisive fact would be an actual enumeration
of the whole people at stated periods; but, as enumerations are
perhaps impracticable in great states and in truth have not been
attempted with regard to the country and periods now in question,
recourse must be had to inductions from the comparison of
collateral circumstances at different times.'55
Similarly, Eden argued that the various "presumptions to be collected
from all the circumstances" was "a subject, with respect to which
mankind have differed, and will continue to differ in every period and in
every country, where they have no actual enumerations to put an end to
uncertainty and to force assent." '56 Finally, Eden criticized the building
blocks of Price's conclusions, noting that they "were founded on
conjectural estimates, and not on actual enumerations."157
152. Id. at 323.
153. Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
154. WILLIAM EDEN, LETTERS TO THE EARL OF CARLISLE, FROM WILLIAM EDEN, ESQ. 179
(1780), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
155. Id. at 184-85 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at xxii (emphasis added).
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Others of Price's critics conducted their own localized "enumerations"
in an effort to undermine Price's estimates. One of those was John
Howlett.'58 Howlett claimed to have amassed "a sufficient number of
actual enumerations of the inhabitants of parishes of every description"
to call into question Price's estimates of the number of cottages not
included in the window tax returns.' 59 In so doing, Howlett expressly
contrasted such actual enumerations with the "estimates" Price and
others had offered, and expressly noted the "infinitely greater, but
necessary trouble" of the former as compared to the latter. 6
Price himself also acknowledged the distinction between an estimate
and an enumeration. In a subsequent response to Eden and others, Price
acknowledged that the reliability of his estimates "depend[ed] on the
proportion of the houses charged and chargeable (and consequently
entered in the books of the assessors) to the whole number of houses in
the kingdom."'' Because not all houses were entered into the window
tax returns, Price accepted the notion that the correct "proportion" could
be best determined by taking "careful enumerations" of the number of
houses "in a great variety of parishes and towns in different parts of the
kingdom."'62 But although Price was "not possessed of many such
accounts,"'63 and although he acknowledged that some of his critics had
"collected several accounts of enumerations of houses" in an effort to
support their view that the number of houses had increased,"s Price
insisted that this was "an apparent increase only, owing to the conversion
of houses holding two or more families, and formerly charged as single
houses, into apartments having no communication, and therefore now
charged as so many separate houses."'65 In Price's view, this "apparent
increase" resulting from the "conversion of houses" flowed from the fact
that the window tax had been extended to smaller houses with fewer
158. See Rev. John Howlett, Letter from the Rev. John Howlett to John Middleton, in VIEW OF
THE AGRICULTURE OF MIDDLESEX 562-67 (1798), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note
95.
159. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 564.




164. Id. at 316.
165. Id. at 317.
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windows, which had been previously "excused" from the tax.166 Because
the division of "single houses holding more than one family into several
tenements having each of them few windows" would ensure that "the tax
upon them might be either lessened or entirely avoided," Price insisted
that the supposed increase in the number of houses indicated by the
"enumerations" cited by Eden and others was simply misleading. 67
Price's critics also discussed the possibility of a "census" or
"enumeration" to resolve the controversy. And again, the context of this
discussion drew a distinct contrast between a mere estimate and an actual
enumeration. William Wales, for example, agreed that the proposal for a
"public census... would certainly be very agreeable to every speculative
mind," but expressed concern that such an "enumeration" might give
comfort to England's enemies who "have always been used to estimate
us at seven or eight millions":
If... such an enumeration should take place, [and] we should be
found short of the number which they have been used to take us at,
they might probably, instead of reflecting that they have a stronger
adversary to contend with than formerly, only consider that we are
weaker than they had imagined, and take fresh courage from that
consideration, and especially, as such an enumeration would
determine nothing with respect to our number at any former time.
6 1
Thus, Wales drew an express contrast between the "estimate" of
population that had been offered and the "enumeration" of precise
numbers that was being proposed. In fact, Wales gave a further
indication of this understanding of an enumeration in prescribing the
method that he would favor "if such a proceeding should be thought
advisable":
I am clearly of opinion the most eligible persons to perform it are
the parochial clergy; and, by them, it would be performed in a very
few weeks. I have heard the opinions of the ministres of some of
the most extensive parishes in England, who think it might be done,
166. Id.
167. Id. at 318.
168. WALEs, supra note 100, at 77-78. (emphasis added). Wales used the phrase "actual
enumeration" elsewhere in this same publication in obvious reference to physical counts that had
been conducted on a localized basis. See id. at 67 (listing a "few following actual enumerations"
from ten different towns at two different time periods as being "all that have come to [his]
knowledge"); id. at 69 (referring to the "actual enumerations" of the "number of inhabitants in ten
cities, towns, and villages").
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even in their parishes, with ease and certainty, in two months; with
the addition of age, situation and profession of each individual.
69
Again, Wales surely shared his contemporaries' understanding that an
enumeration would require an actual, individualized count, and not an
estimate. If such an enumeration were to take place, he foresaw it being
accomplished by "parochial clergy," and thought that they could
complete the enumeration within a "few weeks" or perhaps "two
months" if the count extended not only to numbers but to the "age,
situation and profession of each individual." To Wales, an enumeration
was not an estimate; it was something that would proceed within local
parishes and be focused on "each individual."
3. The 1800 Census Act and the Enumeration of the Population in
1801
Toward the close of the eighteenth century, the idea of a census by
actual enumeration began to take root. Due in no small part to the above
debate, the "climate of opinion" regarding the value of an actual
enumeration had changed dramatically from the time the 1753 Bill was
abandoned. 70 "[A]lmost all of those associated with the debate on the
trend of population had drawn attention to the value of reliable
enumerations," and "many local enumerations had been carried
out ... without resulting in pestilence or destroying the last remains of
British liberty.''
In 1796, John Rickman, who would eventually be appointed to
supervise the first British census, published an influential memorandum
advocating a "general enumeration of the people of the British
empire."'7 Rickman's memorandum acknowledged many of the
concerns that continue to dominate today's census debates, and it did so
169. Id. at 78.
170. GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 90 (asserting that "[i]t was perhaps
unfortunate that the 1753 Bill ... was presented to Parliament before the population controversy
flourished").
171. Id.
172. Id. Glass was unable to find the manuscript of Rickman's "original memorandum," but he
explains that he examined "excerpts" of it "in W.C. Rickman's memoir of his father," id. at 96 n.5,
and Glass includes an "annotated version of the memorandum" in an appendix to NUMBERING THE
PEOPLE. See generally JOHN RICKMAN, Thoughts on the Utility and Facility of Ascertaining the
Population, in THE COMMERCIAL AND AGRICULTURAL MAGAzINE 391 (June 1800), reprinted in
GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 106. This "version" is the one cited below.
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again using the term "enumeration" advisedly. After arguing at some
length in favor of the "utility of the knowledge of British population,"
Rickman described his understanding of the history and nature of an
actual enumeration.'73 Rickman described, for example, the "Census of
Roman Citizens," which was conducted "by collecting them in their
respective municipia, and firmly enumerating all who made their
appearance,"' 74 as well as an enumeration in England in the "24th year of
Elizabeth (in fear of Spanish invasion).., of all men able to bear
arms."'75 But although Rickman generally advocated in favor of a census,
he also acknowledged that a complete enumeration would be "fraught
with trouble and expence" and in any event would result in an
undercount, "as actual enumeration must always be under the real
number.' 76 Thus, Rickman indicated that he would settle for a "partial
enumeration" in "three or four distant parishes in each county," from
which "the population of the whole nation" could be "ascertain[ed] by a
simple arithmetical operation."'
177
Ultimately, Rickman's memorandum found its way into the hands of
Charles Abbot, 17 and Abbot subsequently introduced a "Population Bill"
on November 19, 1800, which called for a full enumeration of the British
population. 79 Both the parliamentary history and the text of the 1800 Act
carry forward the above usage of the term "enumeration." In his speech
in the House of Commons, Abbot complained of the inadequacy of the
existing "inquiries and estimates" of population, which rested on partial
"numerations of the people," which constituted "imperfect data."'"8 In
order to "substitute certainty for conjecture," Abbot's bill called for a
173. RICKMAN, supra note 172, at 106-10.
174. Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 111.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 112. At about the same time, Frederick Morton Eden published his omn work offering
a final "estimate" of the population and arguing in favor of an actual enumeration. See FREDERICK
MORTON EDEN, AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
(1800), reprinted in GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95. Eden argued that "[lthe proposed
enumeration of the people [would] supersede the use of ingenious guesses and plausible
speculations, drawn from such data; and ... prove, beyond the possibility of doubt, that, among the
distresses of the times, we have not to deplore a declining population." Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
178. See GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 90.
179. See Census Act, 41 Geo. 3, c. 15 (1800) (Eng.); GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note
95, at 96.
180. XXXV THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
YEAR 1803 599-600 (1819).
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complete enumeration of the "total Number of Persons within the
Kingdom of Great Britain."' 8 Specifically, the bill required "[o]verseers"
of the census to "take an Account in Writing of the Number of Persons at
that Time being within the Limits of such Parishes, Townships, and
Places... by proceeding together or separately from House to House, or
otherwise, as they shall judge expedient for the better Execution of this
Act," and to "prepare an Answer or Return to the said Questions,
according to the Form prescribed in the said Schedule."'
82
Abbot's bill was enacted into law and Britain's first census was taken
on March 10, 1801.183 The 1801 enumeration was less than perfect. In
fact, it resulted in the undercount that Rickman had said was
inevitable.Y Despite the penalties prescribed in the Act, several parishes
failed to send in their returns, so that the "population was probably larger
than was shown by the returns."' 85 By the beginning of the nineteenth
century, however, England and Wales finally had a report of an
enumeration of population-of 9.168 million.8 6 Significantly, the
individualized counts required by the Population Act were widely
reported as "enumeration abstracts.' 87
4. The British Debate and the Original Understanding of an "Actual
Enumeration "
The eighteenth-century debate over the state of the British population
provides powerful support for the position put forward by Justice Scalia
in his House of Representatives concurrence and thoroughly undermines
the threefold premise of the scholarly criticism of his view. First, the
history of the British debate puts to rest the notion that statistical
estimation would have been viewed as anachronistic to the Framers'
generation. The eighteenth-century conception of statistical estimation
may not have been as sophisticated as it is today, but the participants in
the British population controversy grappled with the same issues and
concerns that are presented by "modem" methods such as the "hot-deck"
181. Census Act, 41 Geo. 3, c. 15 (1800) (Eng.).
182. Id.§4.
183. See GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 91.
184. See supra text accompanying note 176.




The History of "Actual Enumeration"
imputation methodology employed by the Census Bureau.'88 At a
minimum, the Framers' generation would have understood the possibility
of a method as crude as the "hot deck" assumption that a household has
the same number of occupants as its nearest neighbor.
As demonstrated above, eighteenth-century theorists had proposed the
possibility of population estimates based on a per-household allotment
derived from partial enumerations, and they specifically had argued
about whether a representative survey was necessary to sustain a reliable
estimate. Forster's criticisms of Brakenridge's estimates raised this issue,
and Price's critics pressed the same concern. One was skeptical that the
"number and variety of places" from which the various existing surveys
were "collected" might not have been "sufficient to form a satisfactory
average,"' 89 but concluded that an estimate "arising from the aggregate of
correct and well-authenticated information from two or three principal
towns, and thirty or forty villages and country-parishes in every province
throughout the nation, and taken perfectly at a venture," would produce
results as reliable as "the most correct and accurate survey."' 0
188. GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 67 (explaining that although the
"samples" drawn by the participants in the eighteenth-century population controversy "were not
well-designed," 'representativeness' was the aim of much of the work," and "[f]ield surveys were
certainly carried out"); see also H. WESTEGARD, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS
84-85 (1932), reprinted in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY, (Maurice
Kendall & R.L. Plackett eds., 1977) (characterizing Frederick Morton Eden's estimates of the British
population as being based on a method of "sampling to find the average number of inhabitants in
each house").
At or about the same time these methods were being explored in Britain, early statistical theorists
were at work on similar methods in France. A Frenchman by the name of LaPlace proposed a
method of estimating the population in France by "carefully enumerating at a given time, the
inhabitants of several communities" and then by extrapolating the actual enumeration of these
communities to "the entire country." STEPHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS-THE
MEASUREMENT OF UNCERTAINTY BEFORE 1900 164 (1986) (citing Pierre Simon LaPlace, A
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES 100-01 (F.W. Truscoll & F.L. Emory, trans., 1951)). This
approach initially was lauded for "its potential for great saving of time and effort at little or no cost
in accuracy," id. at 164, but within a few years it was rejected on the ground that "there is only one
way of attaining exact knowledge of the population and the elements of which it is composed, and
that is an actual and complete census, the formation of a register of the names of all inhabitants,
together with their ages and professions" id. at 165 (citing Baron D. Keverberg, Notes, in 4
NOUVEAUX MtMOIRES DE L'ACADtMIE ROYALE DES SCIENCES El" BELLES-LETTRES DE BRUXELLES
175-92) (emphasis added).
189. UNCERTAINTY OF THE PRESENT POPULATION OF THIS KINGDOM 22 (1781), reprinted in
GLASS, CONTROVERSY, supra note 95.
190. Id. at 31-32.
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The eighteenth-century debate also foreshadowed the modem concern
regarding the manipulability of statistics.'9 ' Forster expressly
acknowledged that an estimate "built" upon "a small mistake" in an
assumption "will be extremely wide of the truth."'"2 Subsequent critics of
Richard Price came even closer to expressing the modem concern, noting
that "it is easy ... to produce opposite inferences" where statistical
estimation is involved, 193 that "it surely is neither unfair nor unreasonable
to presume that each inference is inconclusive and fallible," '194 and that
"the selection of different periods" for Price's survey would have
"impl[ied] an increased and progressive population."' 95
More importantly, the eighteenth-century debate in Britain
demonstrates usage of the term "enumeration" and of the phrase "actual
enumeration" that connotes an actual, individualized count and eschews
an estimate. Consider Young's criticism that an actual enumeration of
the number of houses had never been attempted.'96 If such an
enumeration had never been attempted, Young must have understood an
enumeration to require an individualized, contemporaneous count.
Price's assessment of the number of houses had been based on the public
records of the window tax, but even those records lacked the
contemporaneous, individualized reckoning apparently contemplated by
Young. Wales's contemplated method of an "enumeration" also
underscores its individualized nature; he expressly stated that an
enumeration would focus on "each individual."' 97  Finally, the
individualized focus of an enumeration was carried forward in the 1801
census itself, where the "enumeration abstracts" reported the (necessarily
imperfect) counts compiled on individualized forms completed as the
overseers "proceed[ed] together or separately from House to House."'9 8
191. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 348-49 (1999)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the power "to select among various estimation
techniques... is to give the party controlling Congress the power to distort representation in its own
favor," and that a "genuine enumeration may not be the most accurate way of determining
population, but it may be the most accurate way of determining population with minimal possibility
of partisan manipulation").
192. Forster, supra note 148, at 461.
193. EDEN, supra note 154, at xxxiv.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 186.
196. See supra text accompanying note 153.
197. See supra text accompanying note 169.
198. See supra text accompanying note 182.
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By the same token, participants in the eighteenth-century population
controversy also drew an unmistakable distinction between an "actual
enumeration" and a mere "estimate." Price's assessments of the
population-built on a per-house "allowance" calculated from his
various "surveys"--were broadly acknowledged to be founded on
"conjectural estimates," not on "actual enumerations." Even Price
himself acknowledged this distinction, noting that only "careful
enumerations[], would shew how far [his estimate] deviates from truth,"
and acknowledging that he was "not possessed of many such
accounts."'99
The skeptical response to all of this would be to say that the talk of an
enumeration as an individualized count and not an estimate merely
conveys a preference for accuracy over conjecture, and does not suggest
that an enumeration was understood to presuppose any particular method
of assessing the population."' Under the approach espoused by the
Solicitor General in House of Representatives and concurred in by a
number of scholars, a call for an "actual enumeration" could be satisfied
by a partial enumeration of the population supplemented by estimates of
households that could not be counted-so long as that method could be
shown to improve the accuracy of the resulting assessment of population.
Again, however, the British population debate belies this
understanding of an "actual enumeration." To be sure, some of those
who distinguished estimates from actual enumerations did so in the
context of criticism of the "conjectural" nature of the former, and of hope
that the latter would "put an end to uncertainty and to force assent. 2 1
But this was only a policy argument that a full enumeration would be
more accurate than a gross estimate; it was not intended to suggest that
an "enumeration" leaves open the possibility of any method of assessing
the population that happens to improve accuracy.
In fact, the above debate indicates an understanding of an enumeration
as a specific method of assessing the population. John Rickman expressly
spoke of an "actual enumeration" as a "method... fraught with trouble
and expence," and his concerns led him initially to advocate a different
"mode by which all useful purposes might be obtained with little trouble
indeed."2 '2 Ricknan's predecessors expressed similar concerns about the
199. PRICE, supra note 161, at 304.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56.
202. RICKMAN, supra note 172, at 397.
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method of enumeration. William Eden suggested that "enumerations are
perhaps impracticable in great states, 2 3 and John Howlett noted that the
decision "actually to enumerate the inhabitants" of a certain parish would
involve "infinitely greater ... trouble" than that presented by an estimate
based on a survey designed to "ascertain[] the proportion between the
number of taxed houses and the number of people in an adequate number
of places."2 4 William Wales thought that an enumeration could be
completed within a few weeks or a couple of months, but even he clearly
understood that an enumeration contemplated an individualized
reckoning."'
Moreover, participants in the British debate expressly discussed the
possibility of partial enumerations supplemented by estimates, and they
understood the difference between such an approach and a full "actual
enumeration." Eden, for example, noted the difference between data
drawn "from partial instances" and "an actual enumeration of the whole
people, '20 6 and Howlett seemed to have the same distinction in mind
when he claimed to have conducted "a sufficient number of actual
enumerations of the inhabitants of parishes of every description" to
undermine Richard Price's estimates. 27 Rickman similarly contrasted a
"partial enumeration," which he proposed to use to derive an estimate of
the full population,2 8 with an "actual enumeration," which he discounted
as being too costly and as "attempt[ing] an accuracy not necessary, or
indeed attainable."2 9
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the above discussion indicates a
recognition of the fact that although an actual enumeration generally
would be more accurate than a gross estimate, an enumeration itself was
not perfect and would result in an inevitable undercount. Rickman's
concern that an "actual enumeration" is "fraught with trouble" is
expressly directed at this point. He acknowledges that such an
enumeration "attempts an accuracy not necessary, or indeed attainable"
203. EDEN, supra note 154, at 185.
204. Howlett, supra note 158, at 564.
205. WALES, supra note 100, at 77-78.
206. EDEN, supra note 154, at 185.
207. Howlett, supra note 158, at 565.
208. RICKMAN, supra note 172, at 398.
209. Id. at 397.
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in that it fails to count everyone: in Rickman's words, an "actual
enumeration must always be under the real number."'21
All of this convincingly demonstrates the error and arrogance of the
conventional view that the generation of the Framers could not possibly
have been sophisticated enough to understand the pitfalls inherent in a
simple enumeration, or of the possibility of less pedestrian methods of
assessing the population. Their statistical methods may not have been as
sophisticated as those presented by modem statisticians, but they surely
understood the difference between an enumeration and an estimate and
acknowledged that the former method would likely yield an undercount.
B. Enumerations and Estimates in Early America
Although the Framers' specific knowledge of the English debate is not
necessary to establish the original usage of the constitutional language, at
least some of them surely were familiar with some of the writings quoted
above. Richard Price, "who was the dominant figure in the
controversy, was "one of the better known writers of the eighteenth
century."2 "2 The Framers must have been aware of a debate of such
significance that it occupied an entire chapter of a review of England in
the eighteenth century," 3 and even found its way into the literature of the
day. 4 Indeed, Benjamin Franklin was the addressee of Richard Price's
210. Id.
211. GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE, supra note 95, at 53.
212. Id. at 12.
213. See 1 F.A. WENDEBORN, A VIEw OF ENGLAND TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 126 ( London 1791); see also JOHN MITCHELL, THE PRESENT STATE OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTH AMERICA, WITH REGARD TO AGRICULTURE, POPULATION, TRADE, AND
MANUFACTURES, IMPARTIALLY CONSIDERED 108-18 (1767) (discussing the debate).
214. See OLIVER GOLDSMITH, The Deserted Village, in POEMS, PLAYS, AND ESSAYS, 23-25
(1844) (stating as follows in a preface to the poem: "In regretting the depopulation of the country, I
inveigh against the increase of our luxuries"). Another historian has concluded that there is "no
doubt that Price gave comfort, if not actual aid, to the colonists":
Before Independence, he was an outspoken supporter of their rights as Englishmen. Afterward,
he continued to speak out in admiration, both of American ideals and of the favorable conditions
which existed for American population increase. His Observations on the Nature of Civil
Liberty brought him far more of a colonial following than his Observations on Reversionary
Payments. The former prompted Congress in 1778 to offer Price American citizenship. But it
was his mathematical talents that the members had in mind when they asked him to organize the
finances of the new nation. He was doubtless well advised to decline, considering the unsettled
conditions at the time.
CASSEDY, supra note 95, at 197.
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first published letter on the dispute, 215  and Franklin's own
correspondence indicates that he and his contemporaries were aware of,
and even participated in, the British discussion on issues of population.216
More significantly, there is extensive independent evidence suggesting
that Americans in the Founding era shared their British contemporaries'
understanding of the words "actual enumeration." The first decennial
census of 1790 has been widely lauded as a significant innovation,1 7 but
it was hardly the first attempt to assess the size of the population in
America. In fact, the colonization of America "was accompanied from
the beginning by efforts to collect and record population data.""21 During
the colonial period, the populations of the various colonies were
estimated and enumerated primarily as a result of inquiries from the
British Board of Trade, who wished to assess the strength of the colonies
for taxation and military purposes.219  Under the Articles of
Confederation, the interest in population stemmed from an effort to
establish a more equitable basis for apportioning the financial burden of
the war and other expenses of the new nation."0 As set forth in detail
215. See Price, supra note 96, at 89.
216. See Thomas Percival, Letter from Thomas Percival, to Benjamin Franklin (June 21, 1774),
reprinted in 21 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 232 (William B. Willcox ed., 1978). The cited
letter from Percival to Franklin refers to an enclosed copy of a paper that Percival had written and
intended to "soon send to Dr. Price" concerning Percival's "Enumerations" of Manchester. Id.
Percival closes by expressing his thanks to "those Gentlemen who have generously contributed
towards the Expence of our Enumerations" and by asking Franklin to "oblige [him] by presenting
[his] most friendly respects" to "Dr. Price" when Franklin sees him. Id.
217. The French statistician Moreau de Jonnes, for example, praised what he viewed as "a people
who instituted the statistics of their country on the very day when they founded their government,
and who regulated by the same instrument the census of inhabitants, their civil and political rights,
and the destinies of the nation." See A. ROSS ECKLER, THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 5 (1972).
218. CASSEDY, supra note 95, at 1-2; see also ECKLER, supra note 217, at 4 (stating that
"[e]nough censuses were taken in the colonial period and the years of the Confederation in North
America to provide a good deal of experience with such operations, even though the results were of
uneven quality").
219. See ECKLER, supra note 217, at 4; see also Franklin B. Dexter, Estimates of Population in
the American Colonies, 1887 AM. ANTIQUARIAN SoC'y 22 (Oct. 1887) (providing an extensive
historical discussion of the various estimates and enumerations in colonial America); TIMOTHY
PITKIN, A STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 582 (1835)
(explaining that "[b]efore the revolution, the Board of Trade occasionally called upon the Governors
to give an account not only of the trade and manufactures, but also the number of inhabitants of the
colonies over which they presided").
220. PrrKIN, supra note 219, at 582. An early draft of the Articles of Confederation would have
required a triennial census to determine "a true account" of the population for this purpose, see THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 27-28 (Henry D. Gilpin ed., 1844), but this standard was rejected in the
final document in favor of a provision requiring that costs of the war be paid from a common fund
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below, the notion of an "actual enumeration" was widely understood
during this period to contemplate an individualized count and not a mere
estimation.
This understanding is also consistent with the meaning apparently
ascribed to the phrase during the debate over the Census Clause of the
Constitution and throughout its implementation under the first Census
Act in 1790. Indeed, correspondence from Washington, Jefferson, and
others during this latter period further confirms that the Framers
understood that an actual enumeration would result in an undercount but
accepted such an imperfect count as the method prescribed by the
Constitution.
1. Enumerations and Estimates in America Before the Constitution
Although some censuses were taken in America prior to the
ratification of the Constitution,"1 colonial populations were more
frequently assessed by means of various methods of estimation.' In
light of the cost and difficulty of conducting an actual enumeration,
"[c]olonial governors looking for data... often had to resort to estimates
in order to satisfy the Board of Trade."2' Such estimates were based on
"supplied by the several [States] in proportion to the value of all land within each State," I MERRILL
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 149 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1976). When it became clear that this standard was unworkable and invited manipulation by the
States as to the subjective value of land within their boundaries, an amendment vms proposed in
1783 to amend the Articles to require a triennial census and to require each state to contribute "in
proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex and
condition.... and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description,
except Indians, not paying taxes, in each state." Id. at 149-50 (setting forth the proposed
amendment); see also HYMAN ALTERMAN, COUNTING PEOPLE: THE CENSUS IN HISTORY 182-83
(1969). This amendment was never ratified, but the proposed language formed the basis-in part-
of the Census Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 183.
221. One author has concluded that 39 censuses were taken during the colonial period. See DAN
HALACY, CENSUS: 190 YEARS OF COUNTING AMERICA 29 (1980).
222. See Dexter, supra note 219, at 22 (explaining that "under the colonial regime, there was but
little systematic collection by authority of trustworthy population-statistics," noting that there were
"scattered estimates of the numbers of inhabitants from time to time in the several colonies," and
warning that "such estimates" were "often intentionally misleading, when officials, on the one hand
of the boastful, or on the other hand of the timid type, thought to serve some interest by exaggeration
or by understatement').
223. CASSEOY, supra note 95, at 72; see also PITKIN, supra note 219, at 582 (explaining that
"[tihe number of inhabitants in this country, prior to its separation from Great Britain, rests
principally on conjectural estimates").
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"documents [such] as land records, militia muster rolls, polling lists, and
general lists of titheables." '224
Historians writing in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
consistently have acknowledged the distinction between genuine
"enumerations" taken during the colonial period and mere "estimates" of
population. In his 1835 Statistical View of the Commerce of the United
States of America, for example, Timothy Pitkin noted that the various
colonies had taken two different approaches in responding to inquiries
from the Board of Trade: "In some of the colonies, in order to answer
these calls, actual enumerations were made-this took place in
Connecticut in 1756 and in 1774, and we believe in Massachusetts; while
in others, estimates were made, founded upon the number of taxable
polls, or the number of the militia." '225 Pitkin further noted that an
estimate of population in "1749 or 1750" offered an assessment of the
population of Connecticut (of 80,000) that was "too low," as that "colony
in 1756, by actual enumeration, contained one hundred and twenty six
thousand nine hundred and seventy five white inhabitants. 226 Pitkin used
similar terminology in describing the period of the Articles of
Confederation, noting that the population of the several States had been
estimated under the Articles for the purpose of apportioning the war debt,
but that "New Hampshire complained that her [estimated] number was
too high; and in 1782, caused an actual enumeration to be made., 2 7 A
1909 history published by the United States Census Bureau"8
acknowledged this same distinction in indicating that some of the early
224. CASSEDY, supra note 95, at 72-73; see also PITKIN, supra note 219, at 582-83 (noting that
"estimates" during the colonial period were "founded upon the number of taxable polls, or the
number of the militia"). In 1763, for example, Governor Bernard of Massachusetts compiled an
estimate of population based in part on tax records indicating that there were about 32,000 houses in
that colony in 1761. CASSEDY, supra note 95, at 73 (citing BENTON, EARLY CENSUS MAKING 45-60
(n.d.)). By assuming a range of between five and five and a half residents per house (assumptions
adopted in contemporaneous estimates in Britain, see supra text accompanying notes 114-41),
Bernard calculated an estimate ranging from 160,000 to 176,000. CASSEDY, supra note 95, at 73.
Because the estimate was based on tax records of the number of houses (which were assumed to be
underinclusive), however, Bernard concluded that the true population was probably closer to
200,000. Id.
225. PITKIN, supra note 219, at 582-83 (emphasis added).
226. Id. at 583.
227. Id.
228. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, A CENTURY OF
POPULATION GROWTH: FROM THE FIRST CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE TWELFTH, 1790-
1900 9 (1909) [hereinafter A CENTURY OF POPULATION GROWTH].
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population assessments were rendered "upon the basis of enumerations"
and others were based on mere "estimates." 2 9
Colonial-era documents indicate that the generation of the Framers
used the same terminology of "enumeration" to refer to an individualized
count and to distinguish such a count from a mere estimate. The General
Assembly of Connecticut, for example, indicated its understanding of the
significance of an "enumeration" in its 1755 response to the Board of
Trade's "Queries relating to His Majesty's Plantations on the Continent
of America."'  In response to the Board's query relating to the "number
of inhabitants, whites and blacks,"'" the Connecticut General Assembly
conducted a "Census of 1756. '  The public records of that census
reported the numbers of "Whites," "Negroes," and "Indians" by each
town within each county in the Colony, and these individualized returns
were characterized as an "enumeration." ' 3
The Connecticut response to the Board of Trade clearly contemplated
a difference between the method of individualized "enumeration"
conducted in the 1756 census and the "method" of mere estimation. It
noted that an earlier report in 1749 included only an estimate-and that
"according to the method of computation then taken" the population
"amounted to 70,000 whites and 1000 blacks." 4 Because the Board's
inquiry asked for "a more careful and particular enquiry," however, the
Connecticut General Assembly authorized an individualized
"enumeration," which found "the whole number of... present
229. Id; see also id. at 4 (distinguishing population assessments that were "partly estimated" from
those that were the result of enumeration); id. at 5 (noting that population information recorded in
colonial Connecticut was 'Tumished more often from estimates than from enumerations"); id. at 6
(distinguishing colonial "estimates" of population in New York, Vermont, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland from "censuses" of population based on a "thorough
enumeration"). Similarly, when more modem historians have addressed this issue, they have drawn
the distinction between an "enumerative" census (which is based on an actual count of the
population) and an "estimate" of the population (which is based on statistical inferences drawn from
a "partial enumeration" of a portion of the population). See A.B. Wolfe, Population Censuses Before
1790, 27 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N, No. 180, at 357, 364 (1932) (explaining that the "[population]
figure[s] reported to the government" in Italy in the eighteenth century and earlier were "based not
on actual enumeration but on estimate[s], or a mixture of the two").
230. See THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, FROM MAY, 1751, TO
FEBRUARY, 1757, INCLUSIVE 617-23 (Charles J. Hoadly ed. 1968).
231. Id. at619.
232. Id. at 617.
233. Id. at 618.
234. Id. at 623.
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inhabitants, men, women and children, (some small errors excepted) to
be 128,212 whites, 3,587 blacks. 235
Similar terminology was used to describe the colonial assessments of
the New Hampshire population. Jeremy Belknap's discussion of the
estimates and enumerations in that colony provides further evidence of
the founding-era distinction between the two concepts:
The late Governor Wentworth was ordered by the British ministry
to take an exact survey; but having no fund to pay the expense, and
no law to compel obedience to the order, he was subjected to the
inconvenience of delay and disappointment. The number of the
people however, in 1767, was estimated at 52,700. Another
estimate was made in 1774, of which I have met with no official
account; but have been informed that it was 85,000. This was too
high. The estimate given to Congress by the delegates of New
Hampshire, at the commencement of the revolution, was still more
extravagant. A survey taken in 1775, partly by enumeration and
partly by estimation, for the purpose of establishing an adequate
representation of the people, made the whole number 82,200.236
James Freeman used similar language in a letter to Belknap on the
New Hampshire assessments.237 Freeman's commentary arose in the
context of his discussion of the reliability of population "estimates" for
one period of time based on an "actual enumeration" at other periods:
The inhabitants of a country augment, as far at least as depends
upon natural increase, in the same manner as a sum of money put
out upon compound interest.... Professor Wigglesworth, in his
Calculations of American Population, has explained the manner of
constructing tables, from which the annual increase of inhabitants,
by natural population, may be estimated for a series of years,
provided their number at the beginning and end of the series, be
ascertained by actual enumeration, or by any other accurate
mode. 8
Some of the Framers themselves used the constitutional terminology
in this same sense during the pre-constitutional period. John Adams
235. Id.
236. JEREMY BELKNAP, III THE HISTORY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 233-34 (1792) (emphasis added).
237. Rev. James Freeman, A Letter, On Population, from the Rev. James Freeman, to Jeremy
Belknap, in BELKNAP, supra note 236, at 468-70.
238. Id. at 468-69 (emphasis added).
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expressed his understanding of an "enumeration" in his correspondence
with a "Mr. Calkoen," whom Adams identified as "the giant of the law in
Amsterdam" of that era. 39 Calkoen's letters had expressed interest in "an
exact and authentic information on the present situation of American
affairs,""24 including specifically the question of whether "America,
notwithstanding the war, daily increases in strength and force."2 41 Adams
responded by asserting that "[tihe only certain way of determining the
ratio of the increase of the population is, by authentic numerations of the
people and regular official returns."242 Although such "authentic
numerations" had been "generally omitted" during the war, Adams noted
that "some States have made these returns."243
In this same series of letters, Adams also indicated his understanding
of the difference between these "authentic numerations" and mere
"estimates" of population. Specifically, in response to Calkoen's further
inquiry as to "[w]hether we have any information that we can rely on,
concerning the population," Adams noted a number of "estimates" of
population in the various colonies based on some degree of
"speculation," 2' and expressly contrasted such estimates with "authentic
lists of the population" based on various attempts at "numbering the
people." '24
James Madison expressed a similar understanding of the notion of an
"actual enumeration" during the period of the Articles of Confederation.
Although the Articles provided that the war debt was to be apportioned
among the States from a common fund "supplied by the several [States]
in proportion to the value of all land within each [State]," '246 "this method
239. 7 THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 265 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1852). The "Mr.
Calkoen" apparently was Hendrik Calkoen, a lawyer in Amsterdam with whom Adams had dined
during a visit to Amsterdam in August, 1780. See 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS
446-47 & n.3 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961). A few days after Adams and Calkoen had dined together,
Calkoen addressed a series of letters to Adams asking "about the United States and its resources,"
and Calkoen used Adams' responses "to spread 'just sentiments of American affairs' in the
Netherlands." Id. at 447 n.3.
240. 7 THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 239, at 266.
241. Id. at 272.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 302-03.
245. Id. at 303-04.
246. 1 MERRILL JENSEN, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
149 (1976).
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of apportioning taxes was never put into operation. 24 7 As Madison
explained, a measure of the "valuation of land throughout the United
States" was "under present circumstances manifestly unattainable. '245
Thus, the Continental Congress enacted a resolution requiring that the
debt be apportioned "according to the number of Inhabitants, of all ages,
including negroes and mulattoes in each colony."249 The resolution
recognized, however, that such number could not "at present, be
ascertained,"25  and thus the Congress adopted "quotas" for
apportionment based on estimates of the population of the several
States.25 ' Madison's discussion of this method of apportioning the debt
drew the familiar distinction between an estimate and an enumeration: he
explained that "no actual numeration of the inhabitants of each State hath
yet been obtained by Congress," and thus concluded that a "computed
number" would have to "form[] the basis of the first requisition" of the
States.5 2
In light of the above, there can be no doubt that Americans in the
colonial era understood the difference between an individualized
"enumeration" of the population and a mere "estimate" (or, in Madison's
words, a "computed number"). An enumeration was understood to be
expensive and inconvenient, and methods of estimation were seen as less
costly alternatives. Franklin and Adams used the constitutional term in
the sense of an actual, individualized count (not an estimate), and
historical accounts of the Connecticut and New Hampshire responses to
the British Board of Trade reflect the same understanding.
What of the notion that this distinction might merely reflect a
preference for accuracy over speculation, and not a prescription for a
particular method of census-taking? The above discussion does suggest
that colonial enumerations were generally thought to be more accurate
than mere estimates, but this history does not leave room for an
understanding of an "enumeration" as shorthand for an accurate count,
247. RICHARD FRANCIS UPTON, REVOLUTIONARY NEw HAMPSHIRE 137(1971).
248. 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 159. (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed., 1908).
249. Id. at 221-22.
250. Id.
251. Id.; see also Samuel Livermore, Letter from Samuel Livermore to Meshech Weare (Nov. 6,
1781), in 18 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789 182-85 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1991)
(explaining that the quotas were "founded on the supposed number of inhabitants in the several
states," a number that Livermore decried as being based on "erroneous pioneer guess-work").
252. 22 JOuRNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 248, at 159.
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and not a prescription of method. The original understanding of an
enumeration as a method of census-taking is stated quite explicitly
above. The Connecticut response to the Board of Trade, for example,
expressly contrasted the individualized "enumeration" conducted in the
1756 census and the "method" of mere estimation. 3 James Freeman's
commentary on the New Hampshire estimates was similarly explicit,
characterizing an "actual enumeration" as a "mode" of assessing the
population. Freeman recognized that other "mode[s]" of assessing the
population might well be "accurate," but in context his statements
indicate that he well understood that an "actual enumeration" was not
simple shorthand for accuracy. Indeed, although Freeman apparently
believed that the estimates he had in mind would be "accurate," he also
understood that such estimates were a "mode" different from that of an
"actual enumeration."
The New Hampshire history quoted above is also telling in this regard.
It indicates that Americans in the founding era understood the possibility
of an assessment of population "partly by enumeration" and "partly by
estimation." In this context, both an "enumeration" and an "estimate" are
clearly understood as methods by which the population may be assessed.
Significantly, this "partial" approach is precisely the "method"
adopted by the Census Bureau in its proposed and actual methods of
making statistical adjustments to the apportionment count. Under "hot-
deck imputation," for example, the Bureau enumerates as many
households as it can by gathering actual data on questionnaires by mail,
by in-person visits, and from "proxies" such as neighbors, and
supplements this count derived "partly by enumeration" with additional
figures derived "partly by estimation." Surely this approach contravenes
the constitutional prescription for an "actual enumeration," regardless of
whether the partial estimates might be deemed to improve the overall
"accuracy" of the count."
253. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 237-38.
255. There is reason to believe that hot-deck imputation may produce an overcount rather than
accurately correcting for any undercount. This risk was especially acute in the 2000 census, in which
the Bureau used imputation to estimate the number of persons living in housing units that had not
even been verified to exist, even after several attempts at verification. DSSD CENSUS 2000
PROCEDURE AND OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM SERIES #Q-34, supra note 16, at 23. Many of the
units subjected to imputation may well turn out not to exist, to be unoccupied, or, to cite one instance
testified to by a former Director of the Census Bureau, may turn out to be storage units. Hearing
Before the House Subcommittee on the Census, Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 57
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2. The Constitutional Debate and the Census Clause
Various critics of the originalist construction I propose here have
pointed to the apparent absence of any specific debate over the
terminology of an "actual enumeration" in the constitutional convention
in support of the view that the Census Clause merely enshrines a general
goal of accuracy and does not prescribe any particular methodology.
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in the House of Representatives case
expresses a variant of this point, suggesting that "[t]he July 1787 debate
over future reapportionment of seats in the House of Representatives did
not include any dispute about proposed methods of determining the
population," and thus that the addition of the words "actual
Enumeration" was merely a "stylistic change" that "did not limit
Congress' authority to determine the 'Manner' of conducting the
census."
256
It appears to be true that the constitutional debate did not focus
expressly on the words "actual enumeration" or include any "dispute
about proposed methods of determining the population." But the absence
of such discussion does not suggest that the participants in the debate
understood the Census Clause to vest in Congress unfettered discretion to
choose any possible method of assessing the apportionment count. If an
"actual enumeration" had a settled, widely acknowledged meaning (as
the history unfurled here suggests), then there would have been no
particular reason for the Framers to engage in any "dispute about" the
method contemplated by the Census Clause.
Indeed, the well-settled understanding of an "actual enumeration" is
entirely consistent with the views expressed in the debate that did take
(June 22, 2000) (Testimony of Census Bureau Director Kenneth Prewitt). Thus, the method of hot-
deck imputation may well produce an overcount instead of correcting for any undercount.
Moreover, even if the use of hot-deck imputation improves the overall "numerical accuracy" of the
census, the Census Bureau has acknowledged that it is unable to establish whether this method of
estimation improves the "distributive accuracy." Consolidated Memorandum, supra note 16, at 15,
35 ("[T]he Census Bureau focused on achieving numeric accuracy because it is difficult to predict
in advance the effect of census operations on distributive accuracy.... Imputation furthers numeric
accuracy.") In other words, although imputation increases the total population count, and thus makes
the "net undercount" appear to be smaller, there is no reason to believe that the estimates added to
the apportionment count by imputation accurately reflect the true population as distributed across the
50 states. Id. Since this is the only sense of "accuracy" that really matters for apportionment
purposes, the Bureau has essentially conceded that it cannot establish that its tatistical adjustments
to the individualized count advance the relevant goal of accuracy.
256. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 363 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Vol. 77:1, 2002
The History of "Actual Enumeration"
place over this clause. The broader contours of this debate-which were
not explored in the concurrence and dissents in House of Representatives
and have not been addressed in existing scholarship on this issue-
indicate that the Framers favored a "permanent and precise" rule for
apportionment 7 and expressly rejected an alternative (i.e., wealth) that
necessarily would have turned on an "estimate." Such an approach was
deemed necessary in light of the fact that a standard that preserved
discretion in the hands of the political officers controlling the census
would encourage an unseemly manipulation-as "those who have power
in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it," but "will
always when they can rather increase it." 8
These considerations initially were presented in the context of the
debate over whether to reapportion seats in Congress on the basis of an
assessment of the States' wealth, as opposed to (or in addition to) their
population. 9 Although an early proposal would have permitted
reapportionment "according to the principles of wealth & population,"
the wealth criterion was soon abandoned, primarily on the ground that
any assessment of wealth would have introduced too much discretion:
Mr. Sherman thought the number of people alone the best rule for
measuring wealth as well as representation; and that if the
Legislature were to be governed by wealth, they would be obliged
to estimate it by numbers. He... had been convinced by the
observations of (Mr. Randolph & Mr. Mason) that the periods &
the rule of revising the Representation ought to be fixt by the
Constitution.26°
William Paterson similarly objected to a standard calling for an
"estimate for the future according to the Combined rule of numbers and
wealth, as too vague.""26 George Mason echoed these same concerns,
noting that any assessment of the wealth of the States would "require[] of
the Legislature something too indefinite & impracticable." '262
257. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 578 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
258. Id.; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 791 (1992) (explaining that the
requirement that anew census be conducted every ten years was designed "to ensure that entrenched
interests in Congress did not stall or thwart needed reapportionment").
259. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 257, at 582.
260. Id. (emphasis in original).
261. Id. at 561.
262. Id. at 582; see also id. at 583 (James Wilson indicating that he "considered wealth as an
impracticable rule").
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Alexander Hamilton offered a similar argument in Federalist No.
36.263 In responding to the concern that the Constitution would invite
"abuse of th[e] power of taxation," Hamilton argued that the method for
apportioning taxes to the States "by the numbers of each State" provided
a significant check against such abuse.2 4 In Hamilton's words, "[a]n
actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule; a
circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or
oppression.265
The Framers' concern as to the imprecision and manipulability of
estimates of wealth surely would have been understood to apply to
estimates of population. In fact, the debates at the Constitutional
Convention include express reference to the possibility of an "estimate"
of population, and a clear understanding of the difference between such
an estimate and a count of actual numbers. Nathaniel Gorham indicated
this understanding-again in the context of an argument that "supported
the propriety of establishing numbers [i.e., numbers of persons as
opposed to some measure of wealth] as the rule" for reapportionment.266
Gorham explained that in Massachusetts, "estimates had been taken in
the different towns" in an attempt to ascertain the population of those
towns.267 Because these "estimates" were later deemed an accurate
measure of wealth, Gorham argued that population was a sufficient
proxy for wealth. As Gorham put it, "persons had been curious enough to
compare these estimates with the respective numbers of people; and it
had been found even including Boston, that the most exact proportion
prevailed between numbers and property.
2 68
Gorham's understanding of the difference between an "estimate" and
an actual count of the population was surely shared by his colleagues.
When the first Continental Congress debated the possibility of using
population to apportion representation in 1774, John Adams had
lamented the lack of actual population counts, warning that "[i]t will not
do ... to take each other's Words" on the matter-that population counts
"ought to be ascertained by authentic Evidence. 269 This deficiency had
263. THE FEDERALIST No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton).
264. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 190 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 257, at 587.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 239, at 123-24.
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not been cured by the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787.270
"The records of the Constitutional Convention contain a few scattered
and partial estimates ofpopulation," but there was no actual count based
on "authentic evidence. 2z ' Thus, the initial allocation of representatives
in the Census Clause 72 was based on "estimates" of the population of the
several States, not on actual counts, 73 and the Constitutional prescription
for an "actual enumeration" must be understood in this context to call for
the latter. Indeed, if the Framers had intended to leave open the
possibility of any method of assessing the population so long as it
advanced the goal of accuracy, it seems unlikely that they would have
abandoned the language proposed (but ultimately rejected) under the
Articles of Confederation calling for "a true account" of the population
in each census,274 or the similar language in place under the New
England Confederation requiring "a true, and just account" of
population.
Indeed, the Census Clause's requirement of an "actual enumeration"
provides independent textual support for the conclusion that the
Constitution prescribes the methodology of the census, and is not a mere
aspiration for accuracy. An "actual" enumeration would have been
understood in the Founding era to contemplate an enumeration "really in
act," not just "purely in speculation. ' 76 The use of this binary adjective
leaves little doubt that the Framers were talking about a method of
assessing the population. An actual enumeration can be read to foreclose
enumerations that are not "really in act." By contrast, it simply makes no
linguistic sense to speak of "actual" accuracy-since the goal of
270. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 220,
at298.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (allocating specific numbers of representatives to the several
states "until [the] enumeration" to be conducted "within three Years after the first Meeting of the
Congress of the United States").
273. See THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
220, at 298 (noting that in early 1788 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney published the "estimates" that
"he said the Convention had used" in making the initial apportionment of representatives); see also
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1945 16 (1949) (explaining that estimates of the population of the colonies were
"based on materials ranging from relatively complete enumerations... to fragmentary data").
274. See THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 220, at 27-28.
275. See DOCUMENTARY SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN HISTORY: 1606-1926 47 (William
MacDonald ed., 3d ed. 1934).
276. See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3rd ed. 1773) (defining
"actual").
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accuracy does not involve a binary distinction, but a more nuanced
aspiration for the greatest precision possible under the circumstances.
In light of the above, it is hardly surprising that the Framers failed to
engage in any dispute about whether the Constitution would call for an
individualized, actual count, since the alternative of an estimate would
obviously have undermined their stated goals. Under the circumstances,
the Framers can hardly be deemed to have been agnostic or apathetic
about the "method" by which representation in the House would be
apportioned among the States. An "actual enumeration" as understood in
the founding era is the only method that is consistent with the Framers'
goal of a "precise" standard that does not depend on "estimates" and
does not present an opportunity for manipulation.
3. The First Decennial Census
The final chapter of the history presented here is the adoption and
implementation of the first Census Act. At least one of the skeptics of the
originalist conception of the Census Clause offered here has suggested
that this piece of history cuts the other way, and supports the conclusion
that an "enumeration" is not a "method" of conducting the census but
only an aspiration for accuracy.277 In support of this view, the Solicitor
General argued in House of Representatives that "the opening sentence
of [the first Census] Act essentially equated 'enumeration' with
'caus[ing] the numbers of the inhabitants to be taken,"' and that the term
"enumeration" is used in the Act in the context of a requirement that
marshals return to the President the "enumeration and description" of
people within his district. 78 In the Solicitor General's view, this structure
suggests that "enumeration" merely "refer[s] to the final product of the
census-i.e., the population totals themselves-as distinct from the
process by which those totals were derived."2 79
This textual analysis of the first Census Act is unpersuasive and
decidedly inconsistent with other provisions of the statute, with its
implementation, and with the Framers' own discussion of the first
census. As explained below, the Framers understood that an actual
enumeration would necessarily fall short of a complete account of the
277. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 16 n.13, U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of
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population, but they accepted this approach as the method prescribed by
the Constitution, and expressly contrasted the official returns of the
enumeration with the estimates and conjectures that would have painted
a more accurate picture of the population.
a. The Bill and the Debate
The initial debates on the bill first introduced in the House of
Representatives focused on the issue of whether the census should be
limited to ascertaining the "number of persons" in each state, as required
by the Constitution, or whether it should extend to gathering additional
data.80 James Madison championed the broader approach. He proposed
that the first census be expanded beyond "the bare enumeration of the
inhabitants" to ascertain "the several classes into which the community
[was] divided" so.that "the Legislature might proceed to make a proper
provision for the agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing
interests ... in due proportion."' In Madison's view, this was the "kind
of information" that "all Legislatures had wished for," and such a body
of knowledge would provide "an opportunity of marking the progress of
the society, and distinguishing the growth of every interest."2 2
Moreover, Madison argued that the detailed breakdown of population
into various "classes" would "answer the purpose of a check on the
officers who were employed to make the enumeration; forasmuch as the
aggregate number is divided into parts, any imposition might be
discovered with proportionable ease. 28 3
Madison's proposal elicited widespread opposition, primarily on the
ground that the broader classification he proposed would be unduly
complicated and practically difficult.28 4 Opponents of Madison's plan
thought that it "was too extensive to be carried into operation," that it
"divided the people into classes too minute to be readily ascertained,"
and that it would require "additional labor" and "additional expense."2 "
280. See A CENTURY OF POPULATION GROWTH, supra note 228, at 42 (providing an extensive
discussion of the debates and of the execution of the Act).
281. ANNALSOF CONGRESS 1077 (1790).
282. Id. at 1077-78.
283. Id.
284. See id. at 1107-08.
285. Id. at 1107 (reporting the comments of Congressman Livermore). Another objection was that
"this particular method of describing the people would occasion an alarm among them; they would
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Madison responded to these concerns by asserting that the enumeration
of the number of persons required by the Constitution would already be
complex and difficult, and that adding the additional areas of inquiry
would add little expense:
If the object to be attained by this particular enumeration be as
important in the judgment of this House, as it appears to my mind,
they will not suffer a small defect in the plan to defeat the whole.
And I am very sensible, Mr. Speaker, that there will be more
difficulty attendant on taking the census, in the way required by the
Constitution, and which we are obliged to perform, than there will
be in the additional trouble of making all the distinctions
contemplated in the bill. The classes of people most troublesome to
enumerate, in this schedule, are happily those resident in large
towns, as the greatest number of artisans live in populous cities and
compact settlements, where distinctions are made with great ease.286
b. The Act and Its Implementation
Madison's arguments apparently carried sway in the House, which
adopted his schedule for classification of the people according to
profession,287 but his broader schedule was not adopted in the final bill. 88
The first Census Act called for each of the "marshals of the several
districts of the United States" to "swear (or affirm)" to "cause to be
made, a just and perfect enumeration and description of all persons
resident within [his] district." '89  The schedule prescribing the
"description" of persons, however, called only for the "Names of the
heads of families" and for the classification of persons as "Free white
males of 16 years and upwards," "Free white males under 16 years,"
"Free white females," "All other free persons," and "Slaves." ' 0
suppose the Government intended something, by putting the Union to this additional expense,
besides gratifying an idle curiosity." Id. at 1108 (reporting the comments of Congressman Page).
286. Id. at 1107 (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 1130.
288. See 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1791
2260-63 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (setting forth the first Census Act and the "schedule" provided for
in the first census).
289. Id. at 2260-61.
290. Id. at 2261.
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The Act also required that the marshals "transmit to the President of
the United States, the aggregate amount of each description of persons
within their respective districts" within nine months of the census's
commencement on August 2, 1790.291 Although the Act did not set forth
the precise method of conducting the "just and perfect enumeration" that
it called for, it apparently contemplated that marshals and their assistants
would gather the relevant data from members of families. Under the Act,
"each and every person more than sixteen years of age" was "obliged to
render.., a true account... to the best of his or her knowledge, of all
and every person belonging to [his or her] family..., on pain of
forfeiting twenty dollars." 2  Moreover, the Act also required the
marshals' assistants to present their returns in the form of the above-
noted schedule, which "distinguish[ed] the several families [in their
divisions] by the names of their master."'93 Finally, the Act prescribed a
penalty of eight hundred dollars for any marshal failing to file his returns
on time294 and set forth a compensation schedule for the marshals and
their assistants.295
"Although the area enumerated at the census of 1790 was only a
fraction of the area of enumeration at the present time, it presented
291. Id. at 2262.
292. Id. at 2263.
293. Id. at 2261.
294. Id. at 2262.
295. Id. at 2262-63. Under the schedule, each marshal's assistant was to be compensated
at the rate of one dollar for every one hundred and fifty persons by him returned, where such
persons reside in the country, and where such persons reside in a city or town, containing more
than five thousand persons .... at the rate of one dollar for every three hundred persons.
Id. at 2262. However, the marshals retained the discretion to award greater compensation up to "one
dollar for every fifty persons" where necessary to provide adequate compensation. Id. The marshals
themselves were to be compensated as follows:
the marshal of the district of Maine, two hundred dollars; the marshal of the district of New
Hampshire, two hundred dollars; the marshal of the district of Massachusetts, three hundred
dollars; the marshal of the district of Connecticut, two hundred dollars; the marshal of the
district of New York, three hundred dollars; the marshal of the district of New Jersey, two
hundred dollars; the marshal of the district of Pennsylvania, three hundred dollars; the marshal
of the district of Delaware, one hundred dollars; the marshal of the district of Maryland, three
hundred dollars; the marshal of the district of Virginia, five hundred dollars; the marshal of the
district of Kentucky, two hundred and fifty dollars; the marshal of the district of North Carolina,
three hundred and fifty dollars; the marshal of the district of South Carolina, three hundred
dollars; the marshal of the district of Georgia, two hundred and fifty dollars.
Id. at 2262-63.
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serious difficulties for the enumerator.",296 For one thing, in some areas
"the danger from hostile Indians doubtless made travel unsafe for the
enumerator. 297 For another, the "boundaries of towns and other minor
civil divisions... were ill defined, so that the enumerator must often
have been uncertain whether a family resided in his district or in an
adjoining district." '298 Finally, the compensation prescribed in the Census
Act was often "barely enough to pay the expenses of the enumerator," so
"it is reasonable to suppose that many of the isolated households of
pioneers were not enumerated. 299
Moreover, the enumerators in the first census also met some
opposition on the part of the public. Some opposed being counted on
religious or superstitious grounds: "An early colonial enumeration in
New York had been followed by much sickness; and the people,
recalling that a similar experience had befallen the children of Israel as
the result of an enumeration made by King David, ascribed this sickness
directly to the census."3 ° Others were suspicious that "the census was in
some way connected with taxation," and this undoubtedly was an even
"more potent factor" contributing to non-response to the first census.3"'
In any event, some enumerators (or "marshals' assistants," as they
were called under the Census Act) completed their work by the fall of
1790, and "many of the newspapers of that period contained frequent
statements concerning the population of different places.""3 2 Most of the
enumerations were completed by the summer of 1791, though South
Carolina and Vermont were still many months from completion.30 3 At
296. A CENTURY OF POPULATION GROWTH, supra note 228, at 45.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.; see also WALTER F. WILLCOX, STUDIES IN AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHY 77 (1940)
(asserting that "the enumerator's pay" under the first Census Act of "between one-third of a cent and
two cents a head, suggests that many families difficult to reach may have been omitted").
300. A CENTURY OF POPULATION GROWTH, supra note 228, at 45-46.
301. Id. at 46.
302. Id.
303. Id. As a new State, Vermont did not begin its enumeration until April of 1791. Id. South
Carolina, on the other hand, had faced extensive "difficulty in getting assistants at the lawful rate of
pay." Id. Despite the fact that "the grand jury of the Federal district court for Charleston made a
presentment against six persons for refusing to render an account of persons in their families as
required by the census act, and also a presentment against one of the enumerators for neglect of duty
in not completing his district in conformity with the act," South Carolina nevertheless was not able
to complete its enumeration until February 5, 1792, more than eighteen months after the census had
begun. Id.
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that time, both Thomas Jefferson and George Washington expressed
disappointment that the mostly completed enumeration had not lived up
to earlier estimates and expectations of the full population. Jefferson
expressed this view in letters to James Madison, William Carmichael,
and William Short. The letter to Short (dated August 29, 1791) is
representative. In it, Jefferson writes:
I enclose you also a copy of our census, written in black ink, so far
as we have actual returns, and supplied by conjecture in red ink,
where we have no returns; but the conjectures are known to be very
near the truth. Making very small allowance for omissions, which
we know to have been very great, we are certainly above four
millions, probably about four millions one hundred thousand.3"
Washington expressed a similar sentiment in a letter to Gouverneur
Morris dated July 28, 1791. Washington's comments were in a paragraph
lamenting that the "enumeration" of the population would fall short of
the "estimate" he had previously offered of the population of the United
States:
In one of my letters to you the account which I gave of the number
of inhabitants which would probably be found in the United States
on enumeration, was too large. The estimate was then founded on
the ideas held out by the Gentlemen in Congress of the population
of their several States, each of whom (as was very natural) looking
thro' a magnifying glass would speak of the greatest extent, to
which there was any probability of their numbers reaching. Returns
of the Census have already been made from several of the States
and a tolerably just estimate has been formed now in others, by
which it appears that we shall hardly reach four millions; but one
304. See VIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 236 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903); see
also id. at 229 (setting forth Jefferson's letter to William Carmichael dated August 24, 1791, which
states that Jefferson is enclosing "a copy of our census" and offers the same explanation that the
"actual returns" are "written in black ink" and that "what is in red ink [is] being conjectured," and
asserts that "we may safely say we are above four millions" by "[m]aking very small allowance for
omissions, which we know to have been greaf"; 2 THE REPUBLIC OF LETrERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE BETVEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826 707 (James
Morton Smith ed., 1995) (setting forth Jefferson's letter to James Madison dated August 18, 1791,
which encloses a "copy of the census" that Jefferson says he "made out" for Madison and indicates
that "[w]hat is in red ink is conjectural, the rest from the real returns"). Madison had previously
written to Jefferson on the topic of the census returns. See id. at 688-89. Madison similarly
contrasted the "returns" with an "estimate." Id. at 689. He asserted that "the returns [had] come in
pretty thickly of late and wan-ant[ed] the estimate founded on the Counties named to [him] some
time ago." Id.
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thing is certain our real numbers will exceed, greatly, the official
returns of them."'
After indicating that the "official returns" of the "enumeration" would
fall short of both his earlier "estimate" and of the "real numbers" of
persons in the population, Washington also offered his understanding of
the reasons for the shortfall:
[T]he religious scruples of some, would not allow them to give in
their lists; the fears of others that it was intended as the foundation
of a tax induced them to conceal or diminished theirs, and thro' the
indolence of the people, and the negligence of many of the Officers
numbers are omitted.30 6
Despite the shortfall that flowed from the negligence of some of the
enumerators and the indolence, fears, and religious scruples of the
people, Washington concluded by expressing confidence that the
"authenticated number" produced by the official returns of the
enumeration would be "far greater.., than has ever been allowed in
Europe," and that the returns (such as they were) would "have no small
influence in enabling them to form a more just opinion of our present and
growing importance than has yet been entertained there."3 7
c. The First Census Act and the Original Understanding of an "Actual
Enumeration "
The history of the enactment and implementation of the first Census
Act is entirely in line with the originalist conception put forward in this
Article and decidedly inconsistent with the contrary arguments put
forward by the Solicitor General in House of Representatives. First, the
text of the Act itself cannot be read to support the notion of an
305. 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 329 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931). A similar
comparison of the enumeration returns with the "real numbers" of persons was indicated in a letter
that John Steele, a congressman from North Carolina, sent to North Carolina Governor Alexander
Martin and to another constituent on January 27, 1791. See I CIRCULAR LETTERS OF CONGRESSMEN
TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS, 1789-1829 4-5 (Noble E. Cunningham Jr., ed., 1978). In that letter,
Steele reported that "[tihe Marshals of North Carolina" were then "engaged in taking the
enumeration of our inhabitants," and asserted that it was "the interest of every citizen" that "it should
be well, and accurately done." Id. at 5. "If it is not well done," Steele expressed concern that North
Carolina would "not have that weight in the political scale to which [it] justly [was] entitled by
territory and real numbers." Id. (emphasis added).
306. 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 305, at 329.
307. Id.
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enumeration as any "final product" of numbers or "population totals,"
however derived. It is true that "enumeration" is used in the Act to
describe the "final product" or the "return" that the marshal presents to
the President. But that use of the constitutional term can hardly be read to
leave open the possibility that the marshal could actually count only
some of the persons in his district and make an estimate as to all those he
could not locate. The Act expressly requires the marshal to submit a
detailed report of both the numbers and a description of the persons
within his district, and to swear an oath that this report is "just and
perfect."3 8 In context, this requirement clearly requires an actual count,
and necessarily would exclude any persons for whom the marshal does
not have actual data as to names and other characteristics such as age
required by the Act. Indeed, the Act expressly contemplates that the
relevant data would be provided by members of families, who were
required to "render... a true account.., to the best of his knowledge, of
all and every person belonging to [his] family..., on pain of forfeiting
twenty dollars.""3 9
The correspondence of Washington and Jefferson confirms that they
also acknowledged the distinction between an enumeration and an
estimate. Washington contrasted the "official returns" of the
"enumeration" with his own "estimate" of the population, and with the
"tolerably just estimate" arrived at in States that had not yet reported
their returns.310 By the same token, Jefferson highlighted the same
distinction in his two colors of ink, noting the "actual returns" of the
enumeration in "black ink" and "conjectures... known to be very near
the truth" in "red ink."3"
308. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 335 (1999)
(quoting Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 101).
309. See 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1791,
supra note 288, at 2262.
310. 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 305, at 329.
311. VIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 304, at 236. Jefferson's letters do
not indicate what methodology he used in offering his "conjectures" of populations whose
enumerations had not yet been reported. Although his precise methodology may never be clear, one
historian has asserted that the context of his letters suggests generally that "as the returns from the
several States came in, the gaps in the series were filled temporarily and provisionally by entries 'in
red ink' in accordance with what evidence was at hand." WILLCOX, supra note 299, at 77.
Regardless of the methodology, however, it is clear that Jefferson appreciated the difference between
the actual enumeration returns and a mere conjecture-however "near the truth" the conjecture
might be.
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The history of the first Census Act also belies the notion that the
drafters of the Act understood an "enumeration" to refer only to the
"final product of the census" and not to the "process" or "method" of
deriving that product." 2 Madison's argument in favor of his proposal to
broaden the scope of the census clearly indicates his understanding of an
enumeration as a specific method of assessing the population. Madison
insisted that the "additional trouble of making all the distinctions"
contemplated in his proposed schedule paled in comparison to the basic
"difficulty attendant on taking the census, in the way required by the
Constitution.""3 3 The requirement of an enumeration, in other words, was
"troublesome" and "difficult," but this method was "required by the
Constitution" and Madison understood that Congress was "obliged to
perform" it in that manner.
Washington and Jefferson similarly understood the constitutional
requirement of an "actual enumeration" to prescribe a specific method of
assessing the population. Despite their self-proclaimed ability to provide
estimates where actual enumerations were lacking, Washington and
Jefferson accepted the fact that the actual enumeration had failed to
provide a full account of the population and were resigned to the
impropriety of supplementing the official returns by methods of
estimation. Indeed, they could hardly have been clearer in expressing
these views. Washington was as convinced as he was disappointed that
the new nation's "real numbers [would] exceed, greatly, the official
returns of them."3" 4 But although he had a practical capacity and an
obvious incentive to augment the official returns with supplemental
estimates (in order to better "influence" Europe to "form a more just
opinion of our present and growing importance"), Washington
acknowledged that he was bound by the "authenticated number"
produced by the official returns of the enumeration.3"5
Jefferson's approach was similar. He acknowledged that the
"omissions" in the enumeration had "been very great," so much so that
the true population was "certainly above four millions, probably about
four millions one hundred thousand."3"6 And although Jefferson
acknowledged a practical capacity to make an "allowance" for the
312. See supra text accompanying note 279.
313. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 281, at 1107 (emphasis added).
314. 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 305, at 329.
315. Id.
316. VIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 304, at 236.
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"omissions" in order to arrive at a more accurate measure of the
population, like Washington he understood that the Constitution called
for census "returns" based on an actual enumeration, not mere
"'conjecture."3 17
With this background, the Framers of the Census Clause can hardly be
thought to have left open any conceivable method of population
assessment-so long as it is consistent with the goal of being "likely to
be complete and accurate. 318 Washington, Jefferson, and undoubtedly
many others understood that the first enumeration of the population was
not "complete and accurate," and they had every incentive to augment
the official returns with supplemental estimates. Their failure to do so is
a powerful testimony of their understanding of the actual enumeration
required by the Constitution, as is the fact that until the last few censuses
Congress consistently has resisted the temptation to authorize the use of
statistical methods to estimate the apportionment population.3" 9 This
forbearance strongly suggests that it believed "that the power [to estimate
the population by statistical methods] was thought not to exist."'32
317. Id.
318. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 364 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In articulating this argument in his dissent in House of Representatives,
Justice Stevens asserted that statistical sampling "will make the census more accurate than an
admittedly futile attempt to count every individual by personal inspection, interview, or written
interrogatory," and accordingly concluded that such method "is a legitimate means of making the
'actual Enumeration' that the Constitution commands." Id. Justice Scalia confronted this argument in
his concurrence by arguing that not all methods of estimation will improve the accuracy of the
census, and that the power "to select among various estimation techniques having credible (or even
incredible) 'expert' support is to give the party controlling Congress the power to distort
representation in its own favor." Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring). Accordingly, Scalia concluded
that "genuine enumeration may not be the most accurate way of determining population, but it may
be the most accurate way of determining population with minimal possibility of partisan
manipulation." Id. at 348-49. The originalist approach I propose permits us to set aside the debate
over whether statistical estimation improves accuracy, since the Framers acknowledged that an
actual enumeration could result in a deficient count that would not be "most likely to be complete
and accurate." Id. at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. See id. at 336 (noting that for most of the history of the census Congress "requir[ed]
enumerators to 'visit personally each dwelling house in his subdivision' in order to obtain 'every
item of information and all particulars required for any census").
320. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (explaining that historical evidence
that "earlier Congresses avoided use of [the] highly attractive power [to compel state executive
officers to administer federal programs]" indicates "reason to believe that the power was thought not
to exist"); see also House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
"[t]he stronger the case ... for the irrationality of that course [of actual enumeration unaided by
statistical estimation methods], the more likely it seems that the early Congresses... thought that
estimations were not permissible").
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III. CONCLUSION
Long before the adoption of the Constitution, an "actual enumeration"
and an "estimate" were understood as different methods of assessing
populations. This distinction was routinely acknowledged in eighteenth-
century Britain and in the American colonies; assessments of population
on both sides of the Atlantic routinely contrasted methods of drawing
"conjectural estimates" with the more costly approach of conducting an
"actual enumeration."
The longstanding distinction between an enumeration and an estimate
cannot be dismissed as a mere aspiration for accurate results, no matter
how derived. Although modem theorists point to the undercount as a
flaw in the method of an actual enumeration, the identification of that
flaw is hardly a recent epiphany. The Framers' generation was well
aware of the fact that an actual enumeration is inherently incapable of
counting those that cannot practicably be counted.
Notwithstanding their awareness of this inherent limitation, the
Framers required that representation in Congress be apportioned on the
basis of an "actual enumeration." They did so, moreover, not out of
naYvet6 or unfamiliarity with alternative methods of estimation, but to
minimize the risk of political manipulation in what they knew would
always be a politically charged decision-the apportionment of seats in
the U.S. House of Representatives. If the original understanding of the
Census Clause is to be preserved, the prescription for an "actual
enumeration" must be interpreted to require an actual count unaided by
statistical estimation.
The constitutional line between "conjectural estimate" and "actual
enumeration" can and should be drawn in a way that would preclude the
Census Bureau's current practice of hot-deck imputation. Under the
original meaning outlined here, an enumeration is understood as a count
derived from observed data such as that provided by a member of a
household. Hot-deck imputation is far removed from such a count; it is
no more than a conjectural estimate based on the statistical assumption
that a household may be similar to its closest neighbor-akin to the per-
household estimates proposed in eighteenth-century Britain and America
and routinely distinguished from an actual enumeration."' If the original
321. Indeed, hot-deck imputation is not meaningfully distinguishable from the proposed Non-
Response Followup Program struck down in House of Representatives. Under that program, the
Bureau first planned to "send census forms to all households, as well as make forms available in post
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understanding of the Census Clause is to be preserved, the Bureau's use
of hot-deck imputation should be ruled unconstitutional and the
apportionment count should be limited to observed data derived from an
actual enumeration. 3" Under this originalist approach, the Bureau is free
to acquire apportionment data (as it currently does) from household
members, neighbors, or anyone else who has actual knowledge of the
offices and in other public places." See House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 324. Because the
Bureau anticipated that only "67 percent of households [would] return the forms," the Bureau
planned "to divide the population into census tracts of approximately 4,000 people that [would] have
'homogeneous population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions."' Id. Finally,
"[t]he information gathered from the nonresponding housing units surveyed by the Bureau would
then be used to estimate the size and characteristics of the nonresponding housing units that the
Bureau did not visit." Id. at 324-25. "Thus, continuing with the first example, the Bureau would use
information about the 100 nonresponding units it visits to estimate the characteristics of the
remaining 100 nonresponding units on which the Bureau has no information." Id. at 325.
Hot-deck imputation is substantively indistinguishable from this proposed method; it has the same
purpose of using "information gathered" from observed housing units "to estimate the size and
characteristics of the nonresponding housing units that the Bureau did not visit." Id. at 324-35. Two
differences between the two approaches can be identified, but neither is of any substantive
significance. First, estimates using imputation involved a smaller percentage of the population. In its
1997 proposal, the Census Bureau proposed to count 90% of the households in each census tract by
traditional methods of enumeration, and to use a statistical model to estimate the remaining 10%. See
id. By contrast, the Census Bureau used imputation to estimate a much smaller percentage (less than
one-half of 1%) of the households that it was unable to enumerate using traditional methods. See
supra notes 59-60. This distinction cannot make a constitutional difference. If statistical estimates of
10% of the population violate the constitutional command, then estimates of a much smaller
percentage of the population are equally problematic; the line cannot be drawn at any place other
than at zero tolerance for statistical estimates. See House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 342
(explaining that the Census Act prohibits the use of statistical sampling 'for the determination of
population for purposes of apportionment,"' and that the relevant population "is not 'determined,'
not decided definitely and firmly, until the [estimates generated by statistical sampling methods] are
complete") (quoting the Census Act) (emphasis added).
Second, hot-deck imputation employs a different statistical sampling method than the method
proposed by the Census Bureau in 1997. Specifically, the imputation methodology employed in the
2000 census is a form of 'non-probability" or "quota" sampling, while the sampling struck down in
House of Representatives was a form of "probability" or "random" sampling. See id. at 324
(explaining that the 1997 proposal relied on "a randomly selected sample ofnonresponding housing
units, which would be 'statistically representative of all housing units in [a] nonresponding tract").
This difference, however, cannot be deemed to elevate hot-deck imputation to a method of actual
enumeration, and not a method of statistical sampling. Indeed, the Census Bureau itself has
acknowledged that hot-deck imputation is a "statistical method" or form of "sampling" designed "to
correct for problems in physical enumeration." CENSUS 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
322. The Bureau's use of observed data provided by a neighbor or some other "proxy" need not
be called into question under this formulation of the constitutional standard. Although enumeration
by proxy data dates only to the 1920 census, see House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 335 n.5
(citing Act of Mar. 3, 1919, § 12, 40 Stat. 1296), such a method is more comfortably analogized to
enumeration by observed data provided by a member of the household than it is to a conjectural
estimate derived from a statistical assumption.
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occupancy characteristics of an individual housing unit.323 It may also
retain a number of other statistical methods it currently uses for the
purpose of editing such actual data or preventing duplication or fraud in
the use of such data.324 What it may not do, however, is to use any
method that would fabricate such data.325
323. See supra text accompanying footnotes 35-41 (discussing the Bureau's current methods of
enumerating the population by the mailout/mailback procedure and by non-response follow-up
methods, including by seeking occupancy data from "proxies" such as neighbors).
324. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DSSD CENSUS 2000, PROCEDURES
AND OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM SERIES #B-3 (Sept. 27, 2000), at 25-51 (discussing various
statistical procedures used by the Census Bureau for purposes of quality assurance); U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DSSD CENSUS 2000 PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS
MEMORANDUM SERIES #B-1 (Mar. 1, 2001), at 20-22 (discussing the Census Bureau's use of the
primary selection algorithm and characteristic imputation); see also Consolidated Memorandum,
supra note 16, at 32-33 n.13 ("Some of the statistical processes incorporated in the Census 2000
include quality assurance, the primary selection algorithm, disclosure avoidance, the duplicate
housing unit operation, and characteristic imputation."); accord Declaration of Howard Hogan,
supra note 16, at $ 64.
325. Hot-deck imputation is the only method that the Bureau currently employs that would be in
jeopardy under this approach. The other methods described supra note 324 do not create data; they
merely enable the Bureau to improve accuracy in its utilization of data.
